Tunisia's Election Was Undemocratic at All Levels

Neila Charchour Hachicha: "Tunisia's Election Was Undemocratic at All
Levels."

Middle East Quarterly, Summer 2005
http://www.meforum.org/article/732

Neila Charchour Hachicha is the founder of Tunisia's Parti Libéral
Méditerranéen.[1] Born in Tunis in 1955 and trained as an architect,
Hachicha is the daughter of the late Mahmoud Charchour, a prominent
Tunisian diplomat and key figure in the ruling Rassemblement
Constitutionnel Democratique (Constitutional Democratic Rally) party,
long led by modernizing strongman Habib Bourguiba. Following Zine El
Abidine Ben Ali's 1987 seizure of power, Hachicha became increasingly
active in opposition and has become one of Tunisia's chief dissident
voices, using her Parti Libéral Méditerranéen platform to advocate for an
end to the one-party state and for the establishment of a democratic,
multiparty liberal system in its place. Todd Orenstein, a research
assistant at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, interviewed
Hachicha by e-mail on February 24, 2005.

Reform in Tunisia

Middle East Quarterly: What does the Parti Libéral Méditerranéen seek to
achieve in Tunisia? What are its goals?

Hachicha: The Parti Libéral Méditerranéen, PLM, believes that democracy
can strengthen national cohesion rather than create divisions and
animosity within the population. Specifically, the Parti Libéral
Méditerranéen aims to strengthen liberal political and economic views.
For too long, we have endured a socialist economic system that
facilitates dictatorship. We seek to educate both the people and regime
about the necessity of moving toward liberalism. We also aim to build
popular support around the Maghreb Union, which should help us integrate
into the greater Mediterranean region. As a Tunisian Muslim woman, I feel
closer to Mediterranean culture than to the Arab Islamic world. But we
cannot achieve our goals without the Parti Libéral Méditerranéen's
legalization. In Tunisia, though, party legalization is not a right but
rather a favor that the government may or may not choose to bestow.

MEQ: Ben Ali won a fourth presidential term in October 2004, with 94.49
percent of the vote over two opponents. Was this election legitimate?

Hachicha: We cannot say that the election itself was not legitimate. The
Constitutional Democratic Rally has held power since independence. With
two million members, its power is beyond doubt. The international
community supports Ben Ali. He has at his disposal the exclusive support
of the entirety of state machinery. Ben Ali may hold legitimacy because
he is party leader, but this is different from democratic legitimacy
derived from all Tunisians. The election may have been technically
legitimate, but under these conditions, it seemed like a race between a
sports car and a wheel chair. It was unfair and undemocratic at all
levels.

MEQ: How does Ben Ali use the mechanism of the state to marginalize
opposition?

Hachicha: The regime uses all sorts of unfair and even illegal procedures
to suppress opposition. He restricts access to media and financial
support, even to legal candidates and parties. As a result, the
opposition remains fairly unknown. There was no comparison between the
time that President Ben Ali and his spouse had on television during the
presidential campaign and the time that the other candidates had. There
was no debate. Although illegal, repression was high. While democracy
requires leadership accountability, ultimately the responsibility for
action is upon the citizenry. Because of citizen complacency, it was
quite easy for Ben Ali to win over 90 percent of the vote.

MEQ: Can internal pressure force Ben Ali to accept democratic reforms?

Hachicha: Internal pressure is very weak. Although it is necessary, it is
far from enough. Since we have neither freedom of speech nor assembly,
and because intimidation is rife, Tunisians feel uncomfortable with any
political activity. Fear controls thinking. As a result, no political
movement has popular or transparent enough support to really pressure Ben
Ali. We are still at the stage where each political movement is only
trying to build credibility in order to gain legitimacy.

MEQ: Do opposition parties carry significant weight in the political
landscape?

Hachicha: Absolutely not! The regime does not show any willingness to
share the political landscape. There is no opening for national dialogue.
The situation is worsened because the international community keeps silent
in the face of the regime's abuses. When President George W. Bush received
President Ben Ali at the White House,[2] Bush insisted on the necessity of
freedom of speech and political freedoms. Almost simultaneously, [French]
President Jacques Chirac talked about the Tunisian miracle and said that
the primary human right is to be able to eat and drink. Recently, the
Italian defense minister cited Tunisia as an example of democracy in the
region. Hopefully, President Bush's tour in Europe[3] will tighten
trans-Atlantic relations and allow the United States and Europe to
coordinate their views, declarations, and actions to help us feel more
confident in ourselves to resolve our internal problems.

MEQ: Then, there is a role for outside pressure?

Hachicha: The international community has a number of tools to pressure
such regimes but should not interfere in internal domestic issues since
we all think that national sovereignty is very important. Unfortunately,
the world community never pressured dictatorial regimes seriously until
after 9-11, when such issues reached the U.S. government's agenda. Even
so, there are still countries like France that support dictatorships.
Because of geography and history, Europe's political impact is much
stronger on a country like Tunisia than is that of the United States with
whom we share no vital interests.

MEQ: Can the Bush administration's Middle East Partnership Initiative[4]
make U.S. pressure more effective?

Hachicha: While Washington is actually doing quite a lot, I am not sure
that the American administration is resolving the problems the right way.
Let me give you two examples. The Middle East Partnership Initiative
(MEPI) may be an excellent initiative that provides a lot of money to
strengthen civil societies in the Arab world. But in a country like
Tunisia that has no independent civil society, with whom will MEPI work?
Will it be with the legal civil society—an extension of the regime? Or
will it work covertly with unrecognized associations or political
movements? I think that before spending any money, the American
administration should first favor a better political context that will
allow an independent civil society to grow fairly and freely. Only then
will the Middle East Partnership Initiative be efficient. Ironically,
when I published a summary of a conversation I had in Tunis with Scott
Carpenter, deputy assistant secretary of state responsible for the MEPI,
in which I suggested that the American administration apply pressure to
force presidents elected with more then 90 percent of the vote to resign
from
their ruling parties in order to allow other political figures to develop,
the Tunisian government censored the Parti Libéral Méditerranéen's
Internet site, and the State Department did not show any support. So what
kind of democratization and freedom of speech can we expect? America
should not put less pressure on Tunisia just because it is more developed
than other Arab countries. Also, many American nongovernmental
organizations are not allowed in Tunisia even though they could be
excellent spaces of liberty, cooperation, and training. It is much easier
for the American administration to get such organizations implemented in
Tunisia than for Tunisians to form organizations in their own country. At
least members of American nongovernmental organizations will not be
persecuted.

MEQ: What about Europe? In 1998, Tunisia signed an association agreement
with the European Union obligating the Tunisian government to promote
human rights and political pluralism.[5] Has the agreement been
effective? Has the EU been a force for democratic reform?

Hachicha: Yes, Tunisia signed an agreement with Europe, but the agreement
is more economic than anything else. As for human rights and political
pluralism, Europe exerted little pressure because the regime argued both
that reform might lead to another Algeria-style debacle and that reform
could only occur upon the resolution of the Palestinian problem. While
European leaders understand that democracy begins with the respect of
minorities' rights, their priority continued to be stability at any
price. Only a superficial pluralism emerged that was under the total
control of the regime.

Islamism

MEQ: The Tunisian government outlawed Al-Nahdha, the main Islamist party.
Would Islamists dominate a democratic Tunisia?

Hachicha: If Tunisia were a democracy, Al-Nahdha wouldn't dominate at all.
In a dictatorship, they seem to be the only effective opposition since
they have access to people through the mosques and don't need to rely on
freedom of the press or any authorization to associate. In fact, both the
regime and the Islamists serve each other. The regime holds the Islamists
up as justification for restrictions upon democracy, and the Islamists
use the regime's repression as a claim to legitimacy.

MEQ: But couldn't democratic reforms lead to a repeat of Algeria's bloody
1992 debacle?

Hachicha: A legal Islamist party in Tunisia would not lead to a repeat of
Algeria. Any party the Tunisian government authorizes could hardly be
more restrictive than the current regime. Tunisia is also immunized to
the Algerian example for two reasons. First, the women's education and
civil status that President Bourguiba imposed at independence are now
irrevocable rights. Women are half of the voters, and Islamists will have
no choice but to respect their voices exactly. Second, our economy is
based on tourism. Islamists can't restrict tourism since, unlike our
neighbors, Algeria and Libya, we have no oil or gas. Any Islamic party
would have to be moderate to get votes and survive in the political
arena.

Differences between Tunisia's and Algeria's post-independence evolution
would also limit the reach of the Islamists. While we were very open to
the West, Algeria leaned more toward Arab nationalism. The Algerian army
also played an important political role, which their Tunisian
counterparts never did. Oil—or lack of—is also important. Algeria's oil
and gas wealth has been a great incentive for people to sacrifice even
their lives in pursuit of power and control.

MEQ: Who supports Tunisia's Islamists?

Hachicha: Officially, no one supports them. Unofficially, we all think
that Islamic regimes financed them at least until 9-11. Being a good
Muslim does not mean being an Islamist or supporting an Islamist
political movement, as Al-Nahdha sometimes argues. Tunisians are moderate
Muslims and are quite secular in their mentality even though secularism is
not enshrined in the constitution. Of course, since 9-11, Tunisians feel
protective of their religion, but they would not massively support any
Islamist party, especially after all the violence they saw in Iraq from
the Sunni Islamists. Tunisians are not violent people and would not allow
outside Islamists to import violence. Hard-core Islamists have long since
fled into exile in the West. The fact that they have not returned
indicates that they do not see a bright future here. At least in the West
they have access to the press and can continue their demagoguery.

The Future

MEQ: Will Iraq's election have an impact in Tunisia?

Hachicha: Of course, there is no doubt about it. It will not only impact
Tunisia but it will impact the whole region. As President Bush said, "The
seeds of freedom do not sprout only where they are sown; carried by mighty
winds, they cross borders and oceans and continents and take root in
distant lands."[6] Iraqi elections will not immediately affect those who
are already in power and are able to get over 90 percent of the vote, but
they will surely impact the political maturity of all oppressed people.
The freedom process, although quite slow and often violent, is
irreversible now. We can see it clearly in Iraq, in Lebanon, in Egypt, in
Saudi Arabia. The domino effect is working. As for Tunisia, only one year
ago, I would not have dared speak my mind like I am doing right now. But
today keeping silent is more dangerous in the short run than giving a
constructive opinion. Hopefully, Ben Ali will listen carefully to avoid a
political crisis in Tunisia.

MEQ: You have written about a national reconciliation initiative.[7] Why
is national reconciliation necessary in a seemingly stable political
system?

Hachicha: You said it: "A seemingly stable political system." Indeed,
Tunisia seems stable, but it is a stability imposed through repression, a
stability that is too much at the expense of human dignity and human
rights. We need real stability built upon individual liberties, freedom,
democracy, and rule of law to insure a lasting authentic stability. Now
why the reconciliation? Islamism is not fate. Islamism is the result of
dictatorship mixed with poverty and despair. Islamism is the proof that
our political system failed in establishing rule of law. Both the regime
and the Islamists are responsible for dictatorship since both, in
different ways, do not respect the constitution. This circle of
condemnation is counterproductive. We need national reconciliation.
Otherwise, how can any political, democratic movement be credible,
especially when the regime totally denies the existence of political
prisoners? How can we exclude even a minority of citizens from the
political landscape and pretend at the same time to be democrats?
Reconciliation is necessary if there is to be any true democratization.
If we want to be an example of democracy in the region, President Ben
Ali's resignation from the ruling party should be the first step. We need
an open, nonviolent government while proceeding toward an authentic
inclusive democracy.

[1] Parti Libéral Méditerranéen at http://www.plmonline.org/.
[2] White House news conference, Feb. 18, 2004.
[3] Feb. 21-24, 2005.
[4] "Middle East Partnership Initiative," U.S. Department of State,
accessed Apr. 27, 2005.
[5] "The EU's Relations with Tunisia," EU External Relations, Europa
website, accessed Apr. 27, 2005.
[6] White House news release, Bratislava, Slovakia, Feb. 24, 2005.
[7] Neila Charchour Hachicha, "Appel à la Réconciliation Nationale," Parti
Libéral Méditerranéen, Feb. 13, 2003.

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