by Uriya Shavit
Middle East Quarterly
Fall 2007
http://www.meforum.org/article/1761
The veil has become the center of a European fight over how to balance
expressions of Muslim identity with the Western idea of citizenship.[1]
How can states achieve a balance between republicanism and minority
rights? Can majorities in liberal, Western nation-states, force a dress
code upon minorities? While Muslim societies have debated various
garments and coverings for women through the twentieth century,[2] the
issues are broader. Often, Muslim commentators in the West couch their
arguments in the Western discourse of the balance between individual
rights and public interest.[3] However, the personal freedom versus
integration debate is only one context of the polemic; another is the
dichotomy between two types of nationality and between two sources of
legitimacy. Here, Muslim scholarship on migration sheds more light than
Western political theory.
Immigration to Expand the Muslim Nation
Muslim jurists since the ninth century have considered Muslim residence in
non-Muslim societies to be dangerous. Not only might residence abroad
weaken faith and practice, they argued, but migration to non-Muslim areas
might also strengthen non-Muslims in their wars against Islam. However,
the pronouncement was not absolute. Some scholars legitimized living
among the infidels so long as Muslims living outside Islamic lands had no
alternative, were helpful to the Muslim cause, and were able to practice
their religion. Here the Islamic concept of nationhood comes into play.
While Muhammad established a nation with territorial dimensions, to
belong to it, one only had to become Muslim in faith and practice. Thus,
throughout the Middle Ages, Muslims who lived under Christian rule could
still be considered part of the Muslim nation.[4]
Throughout the Ottoman period, contacts between Muslim societies and the
West were largely limited to trade, diplomacy, and occasional pilgrimage.
While migration from Islamic lands to Western countries became more common
after the nineteenth century, it was only when the European demand for
manual labor grew after World War II that the phenomenon grew in earnest.
Renewed migration led Muslim jurists to reexamine religious attitudes
toward Muslims living in non-Muslim societies. For the past thirty years,
some jurists have sought to define the identity and duties of these
emigrants. Through new institutions dedicated to migration and, more
recently, using the Internet and satellite television, they both publish
literature dedicated to the subject and answer queries from Muslims in
the West, a process that facilitates a center-periphery relationship.
Most influential among them is Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the Egyptian-born and
Qatar-based Sunni jurist who heads the European Council for Fatwa and
Research, a body established in London on March 29, 1997, to address in
uniformity questions relating to Muslim migration.[5] He also hosts a
weekly question-and-answer program on Al-Jazeera, watched by millions of
Muslim immigrants, and heads the supervising committee of
IslamOnline.net, one of the world's largest Muslim Internet portals,
which clai!
ms to receive a million hits daily.[6]
Regardless of sect, legal school, nationality, or political status, Muslim
jurists from Arab countries have reached similar conclusions as to the
proper status and role of Muslim emigrants to the West. To ban or ignore
mass Muslim migration to the West would only alienate immigrants, they
found. Muslim jurists concentrated instead on constructing a
legal-religious framework to maintain emigrants' Muslim identities while
using the diaspora in the service of Islam.
Their judgment called upon Muslim immigrants in the West to place
religious identity above national and ethnic identities and to promote
the interests of a global Muslim nation. The jurists' consensus involved
five points: First, a greater Islamic nation exists of which Muslims are
members wherever they live. Second, while living in a non-Muslim society
is undesirable, it might be legal on an individual basis if the immigrant
acts as a model Muslim. Third, it is the duty of a Muslim in the West to
reaffirm his religious identity and to distance himself from anything
contrary to Islam. Hence, he should help establish and patronize mosques,
Muslim schools, cultural centers, and shops. Fourth, Muslims in the West
should champion the cause of the Muslim nation in the political as well
as the religious sphere, for there should be no distinction between the
two. Lastly, Muslims in the West should spread Islam in the declining,
spiritual void of Western societies.
Such a consensus developed for several reasons. The political atmosphere
proved fertile ground for renewed religiosity. The decline of pan-Arabism
in the 1970s and the Islamic Revolution in Iran at the end of that decade
suggested that political Islam rather than pan-Arabism could appeal not
only to Muslims in the Middle East but also to Muslims in the West.
Fear of Westernization also catalyzed the process. In the early 1980s,
scholars, especially in Saudi Arabia, developed a paradigm of "Western
cultural attack." They believed that Europe and the United States sought
to use textbooks and television, among other tools, to weaken Islam and
Christianize Islamic countries. Some clerics suggested that Muslims
should counterattack and recruit Muslim immigrants to undermine Western
societies from within, using the same means that they believed Western
societies employed to undermine Muslim societies.[7] Muslim immigrants,
they believed, could be a powerful weapon in the struggle between the
West and Islam.
Here, the political theories of Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood activist executed by the Egyptian government in 1966, had
resonance. Qutb argued that contemporary Muslim societies were as
misguided as their pre-Islamic predecessors and that a pioneering group
of devout Muslims should immigrate to prepare from afar for the
reinstitution of a true Islamic reign.[8] Qutb's ideas narrowed the
distinction between contemporary Muslim and non-Muslim societies and
legitimized residence outside majority Muslim countries. These ideas
bestowed an honorable aura upon migration. Though few jurists followed
his ideas to the letter, he influenced many.
Such theories also played well in contemporary Middle Eastern politics.
Most Arab governments are despotic.[9] While authoritarian regimes worked
to suppress the Islamist challenge at home, they did not hesitate to
assist Islamists in the exportation of their ideas. This was particularly
the case with Saudi Arabia, which dedicated billions of dollars to the
establishment of Islamist educational institutions, cultural centers,
mosques, and media.[10]
Why did some Muslims in the West seek—and eagerly adopt—a reaffirmation of
their Muslim identity? In the early 1980s, many Muslims who had immigrated
to the West as laborers in the years after World War II recognized that
their residence was not as temporary as they had once intended. As their
financial situation improved and their political consciousness developed,
they began to ponder their identity and roots. When doing so, many of them
noticed they were surrounded by large communities of other Muslims; while
in absolute numbers Muslims consisted of only a small percentage of the
Western societies they immigrated to, most resided in industrial areas,
amplifying an illusion of mass.[11] This introspection coincided with the
Western embrace of multiculturalism, which challenged nation states'
traditional quest for homogeneity and unity.[12] However, at the very
time when immigrants from Muslim societies were encouraged to explore
their origins, the oil embargo and later the!
Islamic revolution, terrorism, and the Rushdie fatwa sparked increasing
anti-Islamic sentiment in the West. Together, these factors led some
Muslim immigrants to identify themselves by their religion, which they
considered under attack, rather than by ethnic or linguistic affiliation.
Cultural factors also encouraged religious revival. Most Muslim
immigrants, even those who did not regularly practice their faith, came
from conservative backgrounds. They promoted the sanctity of the family
and a distinction between gender roles, stipulated obedience to parents,
did not tolerate premarital sex or homosexuality, and demanded modesty in
the public sphere. As the second generation of these migrants matured,
growing Western liberalism challenged these values. Muslims in the West
encountered the feminist revolution, the sexual revolution, gay rights,
and the collapse of parental authority. To settle their anxieties about
the breakdown of authority and morals, some parents sought to reaffirm
the Muslim identities of their families. Religion provided an appealing
moral response that ethnic heritage could not. However, religiosity was
not only imposed by parents. For some of the younger generation, the
first-class status they enjoyed in Islam compared favorably to !
the marginalization many felt within European societies.[13]
Theorizing Muslim Immigrants' Roles and Identity
As Muslim Arabs established themselves in Europe, Islamic jurists
developed a legal framework to accommodate them. However wary they might
be of the temptations facing Muslims in the West,[14] jurists, aware that
migrants are in the West to stay, have retroactively bestowed legitimacy
upon all types of migration—whether its purpose is labor, commerce,
political refuge or studies.[15] Even 'Abd al-'Aziz bin Baz, a strict
Saudi scholar who from the 1980s until his death in 1999 was the highest
religious authority in the kingdom, left the door for migration open
because of its benefits for da'wa (proselytizing).[16] Still, legitimacy
was not without commitment. Most theologians conditioned their consent
strict demands for Muslims in the West to maintain their religiosity.
Many jurists believe Muslim migrants to the West have only two paths to
follow: reaffirmation of Muslim identity or its complete abandonment.
Such an understanding places a burden upon immigrants' shoulders: While
religious leaders acknowledge migrants' membership in the Muslim nation,
scholars insist emigrants should comprehend the gravity of their
situation and work to amend it. To reside in the West, a Muslim must make
sure his and his family's identity are strictly maintained and the Shari'a
remains the comprehensive source regulating all aspects of their lives.
Reaffirmation of Muslim identity involves three duties: First, it mandates
unity among Muslims. In his book Islam Behind its Boundaries, Muhammad
al-Ghazali, a renowned Egyptian jurist who was in charge of da'wa for
Egypt's ministry of awkaf (religious endowments), wrote that "loyalty
[should be] to Islam, not to race. The brotherhood of Muslims is the
first connection, even if places and times have distanced."[17] Qaradawi
agreed. He wrote:
With Muslims being a minority in those non-Muslim countries, they ought to
unite together as one man. Referring to this the Prophet (Peace and
Blessing be upon him) is reported to have said: "A believer to his fellow
believing brother is like a building whose bricks cement each other."
Hence, Muslims in those countries have to unite and reject any form of
division that is capable of turning them an easy prey for others.[18]
Success in resisting temptation and seduction for himself, his spouse, and
his offspring conditions the legality of any immigrant's residence in a
non-Muslim society. Qaradawi continues, "I told brothers and sisters
living in the West that if they find it extremely difficult to bring up
their children as Muslims, they should return to their countries of
origin."[19] To defend the family from assimilation does not mean
seclusion from all that is Western but rather living according to Islamic
jurisprudence. The process is ongoing. Parents newly settled in the West,
for example, have sent queries to Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, one of the
leading Shi'i authorities in the Arab world, about the permissibility of
allowing their children to watch Western television, to which he ruled
that parents should forbid shows which might weaken their children's
minds but encourage their children to watch anything on Western
television that could strengthen them.[20]
Theologians have also reached a broad consensus that to be able to screen
the negative influences of residing among non-Muslims or infidels, Muslim
immigrants to the West should dedicate themselves to an Islamic texture of
life. This requires participation in Muslim organizations and
associations. According to Ghazali, the cornerstone for such efforts
should be the establishment of Muslim schools that maintain immigrants'
"relation to their heritage, traditions and rituals as if all that
changed in their lives is their location." He also calls for the
establishment of mosques and clubs to bring Muslims together in order to
encourage Muslim men to marry Muslim women and not infidels.[21] The
recommendations of Fadlallah are similar.[22]
Migration therefore is a privilege only for the strong in faith. For
example, Fadlallah instructs an Iraqi who left his homeland for higher
studies in a Western country fourteen years earlier and subsequently
sought political asylum that if migration does not cause him to deviate
from Islam, then he might stay abroad, but if he fears his religiosity
might weaken, he must return to his homeland.[23] In response to another
inquiry, Fadlallah offers the principal of comparison: The immigrant
should examine whether his presence in a new location causes him to
suffer more or less hardship in terms of practicing his faith.[24] A
similar principal of comparison is invoked in a ruling of the European
Council for Fatwa and Research in response to a query by a Muslim
residing in Brussels.[25]
Most Muslim thinkers further advance the debate over migration with
consideration of proselytizing. In his doctoral dissertation at Morocco's
King Muhammad University, for example, Muhammad al-Qadi al-'Umrani argues
that when the criteria legalizing migration is met, it should be
encouraged for da'wa (proselytizing).[26] Shi'i scholars Yusuf Najib and
Muhsin 'Atawi also validate migration on these grounds.[27]
Rather than be a threat, migration under the right circumstances can be an
opportunity to advance the divine plan for a world where there are no
nations but the Muslim nation and no political parties but God's. Ghazali
urges migrants to be "pioneers" in spreading religion,[28] and Qaradawi
argues, "Muslims in the West should be sincere callers to their religion.
They should keep up in mind that calling others to Islam is not only
restricted to scholars and sheikhs, but it goes far to encompass every
committed Muslim."[29] According to Khalid Muhammad al-Aswar, an Egyptian
author, Muslim immigrants constitute the new frontier settlements of
Islam, defending its values and its interests.[30] He compares the Muslim
to the moon: When not shining in one land, it shines in another.[31] Here,
Fadlallah also agrees. "We expect you [immigrants] over there to be the
callers for Islam, so that new positions will open for us and so that you
open for Islam new prospects,"[32] he instruct!
s. Yusuf and 'Atawi suggest it is the duty of Muslim immigrants to
enlighten the world with Muhammad's prophecy.[33]
Here, the popular literature encourages proselytizing. Some Arabic
newspapers report mass conversions of Christians to Islam. For example,
Asharq al-Awsat related the story of a young woman named Debbie Rogers
who converted with thirty of her friends.[34] A 1997 Egyptian book
published stories of recent Western conversions to Islam and suggested
mass migration is taking place in Europe despite the "Zionist-inspired"
campaign against Islam.[35] And Islamway.com, one of the world's most
popular Internet sites for Muslims, offers stories of new converts
alongside guides for proselytizing.[36]
Dual Loyalty?
If Muslim jurists insist Muslim immigrants avoid assimilation and reserve
loyalty to the Islamic nation, should Western governments regard Muslim
immigrants as disloyal? Not according to the jurists. Both Fadlallah and
Qaradawi, for example, emphasize obedience to laws of the receiving
states and urge new immigrants to avoid acts that harm the security of
those states.[37]
This is not a case of doublespeak. Islamist jurists do not view the Muslim
nation and the West as equivalent structures. They interpret the secular,
liberal nature of Western states as mere social mechanisms enabling
Muslims to practice Islam to its fullness. 'Umrani, for example, argues
that if Muslims know how to hold on to their civilian and legal rights in
societies that raise the "slogans of freedoms and rights for all people,"
then they should have no problem in adhering to the Islamic law.[38]
Yet, there is another, deeper aspect of Western society that allows
Islamist jurists to regard immigrants' loyalty to Western nations as not
damaging: They believe Western civilization to be marked by a moral and
spiritual void and believe that Westerners will, therefore, gravitate
toward Islam. 'Umrani, for example, has no doubt that Westerners will
sooner or later embrace Islam.[39] He sees the Western nation-state as a
temporary entity while the Muslim nation is both eternal and universal.
However, dualism is only allowed because theologians do not consider it
harmful to Islam. Islam and not the interests of the European
nation-state remains the benchmark for any political action. Fadlallah,
for example, argues that Muslims might serve in Western parliaments but
only so long as they guard the interests of Muslims.[40] The European
Council for Fatwa and Research evokes the same principle in response to a
query about Muslims contending in municipal elections.[41] The role of the
Muslim immigrant is to do his best to promote the interests of his
nation—that is, the Muslim nation. Because Islam is blind to boundaries,
jurists argue that promoting its cause is not limited to a specific
community or country but to Muslims everywhere. Thus, Qaradawi argues, it
is necessary to "adopt and champion the rights of the umma" be it in
"Palestine, Kosovo, Chechnya," or any other place where Muslims fight for
autonomy and statehood.[42]
Assimilationist Dissent
For mainstream Muslim jurists, Islam is not a culture, a religion, or a
tradition, but rather an alternative type of nationality which claims
jurisdiction over all aspects of human activities. A Muslim can also be a
citizen of a Western nation state, yet the Western nation state is
tolerated only because it is bound to dissolve and because its weaknesses
may be of use to the Muslim cause.
Many Muslims do not accept such a view in practice, and some—within and
outside the Muslim world—criticize it. Sa'id Lawindi, an Egyptian
academic and journalist who resided in Paris for eighteen years, argues
that Muslims in Europe should follow the model provided by European
Jewry, acting Western in their relations with European society while
living true to their religion at home.[43] 'Amr Khalid, a
Birmingham-based Egyptian television preacher who remains influential
despite his lack of formal religious training, calls on Muslim immigrants
to become an active and constructive part of their adopted non-Muslim
societies. Though he sees Islam as the only solution for all aspects of
life, the role he envisions for Muslim immigrants is that of improving
the West's image of Islam rather than Islamizing Europe. He encourages
integration and broad social initiative.[44]
Many European Muslims also reject or remain ignorant of the roles which
jurists assign them. Even some practicing and devout Muslims, while
believing in the concept of the Muslim nation and in Islam as the future
for Europe, insist upon their independence from any particular
contemporary religious authority and emphasize their duty towards the
society in which they reside and not a larger Muslim nation. They may
advocate coverings for women on one hand and yet seek integration on the
other.[45]
Conclusions
Nevertheless, because Islamist jurists in the Arab world have considerable
resources, they at times drown out or wear down more pro-assimilation
voices. The collision between Western interpretations of personal freedom
and some Islamist interpretations of Muslims' rights and duties is
inevitable. For mainstream Muslim jurists, Islam trumps all aspects of
human activities.
Herein lays the challenge. Many ethnic and religious minorities seek to
establish an autonomous sphere within multicultural societies, but only
Arab Muslim jurists consider such an autonomous sphere to constitute a
substitute for the liberal state itself. Many ethnic and religious
minorities attempt to speak for their countries of origin through the
political systems of their adopted countries, but only Arab Muslim
jurists regard their Muslim nation as overstretching the boundaries of
all nation-states in its political demands.
How then should liberal nation-states, using the principals of liberalism
and multiculturalism as their shield, deal with individuals who resist
their very existence? How can Western societies distinguish between those
Muslims who seek a place for their beliefs and traditions within a
pluralistic framework and those who adhere to a school committed to the
destruction of that framework? Perhaps a good point of departure would be
to understand that it is not veils that matter, but the individuals and
ideas that are behind them.
Uriya Shavit is currently a scholar of the Minerva Foundation, a
subsidiary of the Max Planck Society, and author of the forthcoming Wars
of Democracy: The West and the Arabs from the fall of Communism to the
War in Iraq (Dayan Center, Tel Aviv). He thanks Ursula Apitzsch, Felicia
Herrschaft, David Shavit, and Lance Weldy.
[1] John R. Bowen, Why the French Don't Like Headscarves: Islam, the State
and Public Space (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 13-4;
BBC.com, Oct. 5, 2006.
[2] Buthaina Sh'aban, "Mukadama," in Nazira Zin ad-Din, ed., Al-Sufur
wal-Hijab [The unveiling and the veil], sec. ed. (Damascus: Al-Mada
Publishing Company, 1998), pp. 7-33; Din, Al-Sufur wal-Hijab, pp. 154-86.
The debate centers around Qur. 33:32, 53, and 59: 24:30.
[3] Muhammad as-Shaf'i, "Al Munqabat … wal Tawasul" [The fully veiled …
and the progression], Asharq al-Awsat (London), Oct. 13, 2006; Fareena
Alam, "Behind the Veil," Newsweek International, Nov. 27, 2006.
[4] Sami A. Aldeeb Abu Salieh, "The Islamic Conception of Migration,"
International Migration Review, Mar. 1996, pp. 37-57.
[5] Qararat wa-Fatawa al-Majlis al-Urubbi lil-Ifta wa al-Buhuth [Decisions
and religious edicts of the European Council for Fatwa and Research]
(Cairo: Dar al-Tawj'i wa al-Nashr al-Islamiya, 2002), pp. 5-10.
[6] Gary R. Bunt, Islam in the Digital Age: E-Jihad, Online Fatwas and
Cyber Islamic Environment (London and Sterling, Va.: Pluto Press, 2003),
pp. 147-60, 165.
[7] For an overview of the cultural attack debate, see Uriya Shavit,
"Al-Qaeda's Saudi Origins," Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2006, pp. 3-13;
Muhammad 'Abd al-'Alim Marsi, Ath-Thakafa…wal-Ghazu ath-Thakafi fi Duwal
al-Khalij al-'Arabia [The culture … and the cultural attack in the Arab
gulf states] (Riyadh: Maktabat al-'Abikan, 1995), pp. 129-72.
[8] Sayyid Qutb, Ma'alim fi at-Tarik [Milestones], first ed. (Damascus:
Dar Dismask, 1964), pp. 9-10, 21-3, 30-1; Muhammad Hafiz Diyab, Sayid
Qutb: Al-Khitab wal-Idiolojiya [Sayid Qutb: The rhetoric and the
ideology] (Beirut: Dar al-Tali'ah, 1988), pp. 90-8.
[9] Freedom in the World, 2006 (Washington, D.C.: Freedom House, 2007), p.
15.
[10] Khalid Muhammed al-Aswar, Al-Jaliyat al-Islamiya fi Uruba:
Al-Manafidh, al-Mushkilat, al-Hulul [The Muslim diasporas: The origins,
the problems, and the solutions] (Cairo: Dar al-I'tisam, 1998), p. 68;
Hasan 'Ali al-Ahdal, "Dawr Rabitat al-'Alam al-Islami fi Nashr at-thakafa
al-Islamiya khrij al-'Alam al-Islami" [The role of the Muslim World League
in spreading the Muslim culture outside the Muslim world], in Hawiyat
al-Muslimun wa Thaqafatuhum fi Uruba (Rabat: Matba'at al-M'aarif
al-Jadida, 1995), pp. 141-8.
[11] Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia, The
European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, Vienna, 2006, p. 22;
'Abd al-Majid Bakr, Al-Aqaliyat al-Muslima fi Uruba (Saudi Arabia: Hayat
al-Ighatha al-Islamiya al-'Alamiya, 1992.)
[12] Rogers Brubaker, "The Return of Assimilation? Changing Perspectives
on Immigration and Its Sequels in France, Germany, and the United
States," in Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska, eds., Towards Assimilation
and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-states (New York: Palgrave,
2003), p. 39.
[13] Bowen, Why the French Don't Like Headscarves, pp. 66-8.
[14] Muhammad al-Kadi al-'Umrani, Fiqh al-Usra al-Muslima fi al-Muhajar
[The Religious law of the migrating Muslim family] (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub
al-'Ilmiya, 2001), part I, pp. 53-65; Najib Yusuf and Muhsin 'Atawi,
Dalil al-Muslim fi Bilad al-Ghurba [Reference of the Muslim in foreign
countries] (Beirut: Dar at-Ta'aruf lil-Matbu'at, 1990), pp. 21-31.
[15] 'Umrani, Fiqh al-Usra al-Muslima fi al-Muhajar, p. 29-127; Yusuf and
'Atawi, Dalil al-Muslim fi Bilad al-Ghurba, pp. 31-2.
[16] 'Abd al-'Aziz bin 'Abd-Allah bin Baz, "Hukm as-Safr kharij ad-Duwal
al-Islamiya" [The rule of traveling outside Muslim lands], accessed Mar.
29, 2007; idem, "Hukm as-Safr ila al-Kharij lil-Dirasa wa Ghyriha" [The
rule of traveling abroad for study and other purposes], accessed Mar. 29,
2007; idem, "As-Safr ila al-Kharij" [Travel abroad], accessed Mar. 29,
2007.
[17] Muhammad al-Ghazali, Mustaqbal al-Islam kharij Ardihi: Kayf Nufakir u
fihi? (Amman: Orient Public Relations, Publishing and Translation, 1984),
p. 138.
[18] Yusuf al-Qaradawi, "Duties of Muslims Living in the West," Islam
Online.net, May 7, 2006.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, Tahaduyat al-Muhajir, bayna al-Asala wal
Mu'asara [The challenges of the immigrant between rootedness and
modernity] (Beirut: Dar al-Malak, 2000), p. 125.
[21] Ghazali, Mustaqbal al-Islam kharij Ardihi, pp. 155-7.
[22] Fadlallah, Tahaduyat al-Muhajir, bayna al-Asala wal Mu'asara, pp.
87-8, 92-5.
[23] Ibid., p. 89.
[24] Ibid., pp. 75-86.
[25] Qararat wa-Fatawa, p. 30.
[26] 'Umrani, Fiqh al-Usra al-Muslima fi al-Muhajar, pp. 29-127.
[27] Yusuf and 'Atawi, Dalil al-Muslim fi Bilad al-Ghurba, pp. 31-2.
[28] Ghazali, Mustaqbal al-Islam kharij Ardihi, p. 104.
[29] Qaradawi, "Duties of Muslims Living in the West."
[30] Aswar, Al-Jaliyat al-Islamiya fi Uruba, pp. 7-8.
[31] Ibid., p. 313.
[32] Fadlallah, Tahaduyat al-Muhajir, bayna al-Asala wal Mu'asara, p. 82.
[33] Yusuf and 'Atawi, Dalil al-Muslim fi Bilad al-Ghurba, p. 32.
[34] Mar. 18, 2001.
[35] Yasir Hussein, Al-Islam Mustaqbal Uruba (Cairo: Dar al-'Amin, 1997).
[36] "Amazing Interview with a 14-years Old New Muslimah," Islam Way
Radio, accessed Mar. 29, 2007.
[37] Qaradawi, "Duties of Muslims Living in the West"; Fadlallah,
Tahaduyat al-Muhajir, bayna al-Asala wal Mu'asara, p. 88
[38] 'Umrani, Fiqh al-Usra al-Muslima fi al-Muhajar, p. 4.
[39] Ibid., p. 51
[40] Fadallah, Tahaduyat al-Muhajir, bayna al-Asala wal Mu'asara, p. 334.
[41] Qarart wa Fatawa, p. 95.
[42] Qaradawi, "Duties of Muslims Living in the West."
[43] Sa'id Lawindi, Fubiya al-Islam fi al-Gharb [The Islamophobia in the
West] (Cairo: Dar al-Akhbar, 2006), pp. 136-7.
[44] Amr Khalid, "Between Integration and Introversion," accessed Mar. 29,
2007.
[45] Author interviews with eighteen Muslims, Frankfurt am Main, Germany,
Nov. 2006-May 2007; author observations in mosques and centers.
----------------------------------------------------------------
This e-mail has been sent via JARING webmail at http://www.jaring.my
No comments:
Post a Comment