Now that Suharto is gone, our focus turns to the military junta in
Burma and their brutal suppression of their own people. Once again, ASEAN
governments are turning a blind eye to what can only be a major diplomatic
and regional crisis in the near future
The verdict of history is still not out yet following the demise of
General-turned-President Suharto. For all his achievements in putting his
country on the map and leading Indonesia towards industrial development,
Suharto's human rights record remains one of the bloodiest in the
post-colonial history of Southeast Asia, matched only by that of
Ferdinand Marcos, who was likewise one of the great strongmen of Asia.
Suharto presided over one of the most spectacular socio-economic
transformations in Asia of the 20th century: his nation of more than two
hundred million souls was transformed over a period of three decades from
a faltering post-colonial economy on the verge of bankruptcy into one of
the most attractive destinations for foreign capital investment.
Yet the social and economic costs were high: Indonesia was sold as a
source of cheap human labour and natural resources, to be exploited and
plundered by foreign multinationals as never before. During this period,
normal political activity in the country came to a standstill; political
parties were either disbanded or forced to merge; political dissidents
were routinely harassed, silence and incarcerated, with hundreds more
liquidated at will by the armed forces and security agencies of the
state. The Indonesian press was stifled; students told not to enter the
arena of politics; feudal structures were reinforced while corruption was
allowed to run rampant.
When he was deposed in May 1998, Suharto left office as one of the most
corrupt leaders of the Third World, amassing wealth to the tune of
billions of dollars that had been expatriated to foreign banks. Until
today there is still no accounting of the exact extent and magnitude of
his and his family's corruption, and their collusion with the forces of
capital and the army that kept this entire system of patronage and state
violence intact for so long.
There are, however, some important lessons to be learned from this complex
and often painful — and extended — episode of Indonesian history.
Suharto would never have been allowed to get away with his multiple abuses
of power had he opted to keep Indonesia neutral during the Cold War, which
was the preferred option of his predecessor Sukarno. It was Sukarno's
commitment to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and his support of
progressive anti-imperialist causes worldwide that aligned him to other
outstanding Third World leaders like India's Nehru. But Sukarno was
accused by many of the governments of the West — notably the United
States of America — as being too 'soft' on Communism for his attempt to
keep the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in the fold of national
politics via the NASAKOM (Nasionalisme-Agama Komunisme) alliance of the
1960s.
During the 1950s, numerous Western governments regarded Sukarno in the
same light as other anti-colonial Third World leaders such as Patrice
Lumumba, and plans were made to remove him from the political stage
altogether. When the young Indonesian republic was rocked by a series of
internal civil conflicts, it was the US that even supported some of the
Islamist-fundamentalist secessionist movements, mainly with the aim of
toppling the Indonesian government.
Suharto performed a major U-turn by re-aligning Indonesia to the West, in
particular the United States, following the downfall of Sukarno in 1970.
Since then it was the US that was Indonesia's staunchest ally, supporting
Suharto in his 'battle against Communism' when Southeast Asia was declared
'the second front' in the 'war on Communism'. (Very much like how the
ASEAN region today is described as 'the second front' in the 'War on
Terror'.)
Suharto's close relationship to the governments and corporations of the
West guaranteed that he and his generals and cronies were able to command
and rule the country at will. And it was this that allowed the Indonesian
army to march into East Timor in 1974 to forcibly annex the country.
Yet while the massacre of East Timorese civilians was taking place,
Washington and its allies were more vocal in their condemnation of human
rights abuses taking place in the Soviet bloc. Needless to say, had
Suharto sided with the Russians then, he would have been put in the same
category of 'Communists dictators' like Tito instead, and duly dealt
with.
This is the first lesson that was learned by the dictators of ASEAN since
the 1960s and the rise of American global power: that one can rule one's
country with an iron fist and pay scant regard to human rights as long as
you are on Uncle Sam's side. Marcos understood this, as did South
Vietnam's despot Bao Dai. Today the same lesson has been learned by a
host of American crony-puppets all over the world.
The second lesson is that the atrocities that take place in any ASEAN
country can be carried out as long as there is no dissent from your
neighbours who can be persuaded to look the other way. The great tragedy
of Indonesia during the 1970s-1990s was that while the country was being
robbed and pillaged by its own leaders, the leaders and governments of
ASEAN stood still and said nothing.
If Indonesia today is plagued by a host of problems ranging from religious
militancy to chronic economic failure and massive unemployment (which in
turn leads to other pan-regional problems like the illegal migration of
Indonesians to neighbouring countries), then it is partly because the
other countries of ASEAN did not see fit (or did not have the moral
courage) to say anything. ASEAN is as much at fault for Indonesia's
crisis now as Suharto was, and we — the citizens of ASEAN — have to bear
the blame and responsibility too.
Now that Suharto is gone, our focus turns to the military junta in Burma
and their brutal suppression of their own people. Once again, ASEAN
governments are turning a blind eye to what can only be a major
diplomatic and regional crisis in the near future. Yet will we take the
lessons of Suharto's mistakes (and ours) to heart? Or will we once again
do nothing, and by doing so pay the price and commit the sin of passive
neglect and negative responsibility?
Dr Farish A Noor is Senior Fellow and Research Director at the Rajaratnam
School of International Studies of Nanyang Technical University,
Singapore. He is also one of the founders of the www.othermalaysia.org
research site
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