"Radical Islam vs. Civilization"

Radical Islam vs. Civilization

by Daniel Pipes
FrontPageMagazine.com
February 1, 2007
http://www.danielpipes.org/article/4254

Text of a talk presented by Daniel Pipes on January 20, 2007, in London in
a debate with the mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, as transcribed by the
910 Group with the help of others. The original posting of the video can
be seen at YouTube; for a single clip version, see the posting at the
Global Defense Group. For accounts of the debate, see the bibliography at
"My Debate with London Mayor Ken Livingstone."

Thank you so much. I'd like to begin by thanking Mayor Livingstone for his
kind invitation to join you today and I thank the Greater London Authority
for the hard work it put into what is obviously a successful event. I am
delighted by the interest that you, the audience, has shown. And I'm
grateful to my supporters who have come from four different countries to
be with me today.

The Mayor is an optimistic man. I'm generally invited to bring along some
gloom, and I will, true to form, provide some for you. [audience
laughter]

Let me start with my position on the question of world civilization or
clash of civilizations. One: I am for world civilization, and I reject
the 'clash of civilization' argument. Two: The problem is not so much a
clash of civilizations, but a clash of civilization and barbarism.

I'd like to begin by looking at Samuel Huntington's idea. He argued that
cultural differences, in his 1993 article, are paramount. "The
fundamental source of conflict … will not be primarily ideological or
primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the
dominating source of conflict will be cultural." And in all he finds
seven or eight set civilizations, namely, "Western, Confucian, Japanese,
Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African."

My response is that civilization is useful as a cultural concept but not
as a political one. There are three problems with seeing civilizations as
actors in the way that Huntington suggests. It can't account for tensions
within a single civilization, it can't account for agreement across
civilizations, and it doesn't account for change over time. Let me give
you three quick examples. I'll take them from the area that I have
studied, which is the Muslim world.

First, it cannot account for Muslim-on-Muslim violence, of which there is
a great deal: We have the civil war in Lebanon, the Iraq-Iran war, the
Islamist insurgency in Algeria, the Sunnis vs. Shi'is in Iraq at present,
the near civil war in the Palestinian Authority, the Sudanese government
against the people of Darfur. This cannot be accounted for in
civilizational terms.

Second, it ignores the agreement across civilizations. I'd like to take a
UK-based example, namely the edict of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 against
Salman Rushdie, who at that time was living in London. It appeared, at
first glance, to be a question of Muslims on one side and Westerners on
the other. Muslims were burning The Satanic Verses novel, there was
violence in India, etc. But a closer look showed that in fact it was
quite something different, it was far more complex. There were plenty of
Westerners who were against Rushdie and plenty of Muslims who supported
him.

Let me give you just a couple of quotes,. The foreign secretary of Britain
at that time, Sir Geoffrey Howe, said "the British government, the British
people do not have any affection for Rushdie's book." On the other hand,
the Egyptian foreign minister said "Khomeini had no right to sentence
Rushdie to death." And another Egyptian minister said "Khomeini is a dog,
no, that is too good for him, he is a pig." [audience laughter]

Third point, Huntington in his analysis can't account for change over
time. And I can best illustrate this by giving you a quote from his 1993
article, He said "The economic issues between the United States and
Europe are no less serious than those between the United States and
Japan, but they do not have the same political salience and emotional
intensity because the differences between American culture and European
culture are so much less than those between American civilization and
Japanese civilization."

Well that was true enough in 1993, but it sounds pretty silly in 2007
where there are virtually no tensions between the United States and Japan
and I'm sure you are aware there are tensions between the United States
and Europe. The vituperation is far more severe across the Atlantic than
the Pacific.

What Huntington did was to take an incident of the moment and turn them
into something civilizational and it didn't work. In short the clash of
civilization idea fails, it does not fit the facts, it is not a good way
to understand the world.

What about then a world civilization? Can it exist? If one defines it as
Huntington does, as a culture, basically then, no, it can't. As he puts
it, correctly, "for the relevant future there will be no universal
civilization but instead a world of different civilizations, each of
which will have to learn to coexist with the others." I don't think there
is anyone who would dispute that.

But yes, there can be a world civilization if one defines it differently.
Civilization can be the opposite of barbarism. And civilization in this
sense has a long history. In the Bible, there is a passage, "And ye
shall… proclaim liberty throughout all the lands and unto all the
inhabitants thereof." In the Koran, "you are the best community ever
raised among mankind, you advocate righteousness and forbid evil, and
believe in God." The American byword is 'the pursuit of happiness', the
French is "Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité " Winston Churchill in 1898,
writing about the Sudan, said that civilization is "sympathetic,
merciful, tolerant, ready to discuss or argue, eager to avoid violence,
to submit to law, to effect compromise."

So the question is, can this state of being, of being civilized, can it
exist on a world level?

It can, in so far as those who are civilized confront those who are not
civilized. The world civilization exists of civilized elements in every
culture banding together to protect ethics, liberty and mutual respect.
The real clash is between them and the barbarians.

Now what do I mean by barbarians? I do not mean people who are of lower
economic stature. What I mean by barbarians – and I think all of us mean
by barbarians in the past two centuries – are ideological barbarians.
This is what emerged in the French revolution in the late 18[th] century.
And the great examples of ideological barbarism are fascism and Marxist
Leninism – they, in their course of their histories have killed tens of
millions of people.

But today it's a third, a third totalitarian movement, a third barbarian
movement, namely that of radical Islam. It is an extremist utopian
version of Islam. I am not speaking of Islam the religion, I am speaking
of a very unusual and modern reading of Islam. It has inflicted misery
(as I mentioned Algeria and Darfur, before), there is suicide terrorism,
tyrannical and brutal governments, there is the oppression of women, and
non-Muslims.

It threatens the whole world:. Morocco, Turkey, Palestinian Authority,
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, you name it, Afghanistan,
Tunisia, and not just the traditional Muslim world, but also Russia,
France, Sweden, and I dare say, the United Kingdom.

The great question of our time is how to prevent this movement, akin to
fascism and communism, from growing stronger.

Now, I believe the mayor and I agree on the need to withstand this menace,
but we disagree on the means of how to do it. He looks to
multiculturalism, and I to winning the war. He wants everyone to get
along; I want to defeat a terrible enemy.

The mayor defines multiculturalism as "the right to pursue different
cultural values subject only to the restriction that they should not
interfere with the similar right for others." And he argues, as you just
heard, that it works, that London is a successful city. I won't dispute
his specifics, but I do see the multicultural impulse creating disaster
by ignoring a dangerous and growing presence of radical Islam in London.

One evocative sign of this danger is that citizens in your country have
become a threat for the rest of the world. In 2003, Home Secretary David
Blunkett presented a dossier to a Special Immigration Appeals Commission
in which he "admits that Britain was a safe haven for supporters of
worldwide terrorism" and in which he said Britain remains a "significant
base'" for supporting terrorism.

Indeed, British-based terrorists have carried out operations in at least
fifteen countries. Going from east to west, they include Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Kenya, Tanzania, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iraq, Jordan, Israel,
Algeria, Morocco, Russia, France, Spain, and the United States. I'll give
you one example, from the United States: it was Richard Reid, the shoe
bomber, who I am primarily thinking of, but there is also the [End of
clip #3; Start of clip #4] British involvement in 9/11 and in the
Millennium Plot that did not take place in Los Angeles.

In frustration, Egypt's President Husni Mubarak publicly denounced the UK
for "protecting killers." After the August 10[th] thwarted Heathrow
airline mega-plot, of a few months ago, two American authors argued in
The New Republic, that from an American point of view, "it can now be
argued that the biggest threat to U.S. security emanates not from Iran or
Iraq or Afghanistan—but rather from Great Britain."

And I believe this is the tip of the iceberg. I believe it refutes Mr.
Livingstone's opposing view.- that there isn't a problem. This is the
problem, the problem is radical Islam, also known as fundamentalist
Islam, political Islam, Islamism. It is not, again, Islam the religion,
it is radical Islam, the ideology.

Let us focus on three aspects of it. The essence of radical Islam is the
complete adherence to the Shari'a, to the law of Islam. And it is
extending the Shari'a into areas that never existed before.

Second, it is based very deeply on a clash of civilizations ideology. It
divides the world into two parts, the moral and the immoral, the good and
the bad. Here is one quote from a British-based Islamist by the name of
Abdullah el-Faisal, who was convicted and is now in jail. "There are two
religions in the world today - the right one and the wrong one. Islam
versus the rest of the world." You don't get a more basic
clash-of-civilization orientation than that. There is a hatred of the
outside world, of the non-Muslim world, and the West in particular. There
is the intent to reject as much as possible of outside influence.

The third feature is that this is totalitarian in nature. It turns Islam
from a personal faith into an ideology, into an ism. It is the
transformation of a personal faith into a system for ordering power and
wealth. Radical Islam derives from Islam but is an anti-modern,
millenarian, misanthropic, misogynist, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic,
triumphalist, jihadistic, terroristic, and suicidal version of it. It is
Islamic-flavored totalitarianism.

Like fascism and communism, radical Islam is a compelling way of seeing
the world in a way that can absorb an intelligent person – to show him or
her a whole new way of seeing life. It is radically utopian and takes the
mundane qualities of everyday life and turns them into something grand
and glistening.

There is an attempt to take over states. There is the use of the state for
coercive purposes, and an attempt to dominate all of life, every aspect of
it. It is an aggression against neighbors, and finally it is a cosmic
confrontation with the West. As Tony Blair put it in August of 2006, "We
are fighting a war, but not just against terrorism but about how the
world should govern itself in the early 21[st] century, about global
values."

Now how does one respond to this?

The mayor is a man of the Left, and I am a classical liberal. We can agree
that neither of us personally wishes to be subjected to the Shari'a. I
will assume, you [looking at Ken Livingstone] will correct me if I am
wrong [short sporadic applause] that neither of us want this as part of
our personal life.

But our views diverge sharply as to how to respond to this phenomenon.
Those of my political outlook are alarmed by Islamism's advances in the
West. Much of the Left approaches the topic in a far more relaxed
fashion.

Why this difference? Why generally is the right alarmed, and the left much
more sanguine? There are many differences, there are many reasons, but I'd
like to focus on two.

One is a sense of shared opponents between the Islamists and those on the
left. George Galloway explained in 2005, "the progressive movement around
the world and the Muslims have the same enemies," which he then went on to
indicate were Israel, the United States, and Great Britain.

And if you listen to the words that are spoken about, say the United
States, you can see that this is in fact the case. Howard Pinter has
described America as "a country run by a bunch of criminal lunatics."
[big applause and shouts] And Osama Bin Laden [stops … ] I'll do what I
can to get an applause line. [laughter] And, get ready for this one:
Osama Bin Laden called the United States, "unjust, criminal, and
tyrannical." [applause]

Noam Chomsky termed America "a leading terrorist state". And Hafiz Hussain
Ahmed, a leading Pakistani political leader, called it the "biggest
terrorist state." [scattered applause]

Such common ground makes it tempting for those on the Left to make common
cause with Islamists, and the symbol of this would be the [huge, anti-war
in Iraq] demonstrations in Hyde Park, on the 16[th] of February 2003,
called by a coalition of leftist and Islamist organizations.

At other times, the Left feels a kinship with Islamist attacks on the
West, forgiving, understanding why these would happen. A couple of
notorious quotes make this point. The German composer, Karlheinz
Stockhausen termed the 9/11 attacks "the greatest work of art for the
whole cosmos," while American novelist Norman Mailer, commented that "the
people who did this were brilliant."

Such attitudes tempt the Left not to take seriously the Islamist threat to
the West. With John Kerry, a former aspirant to the [U.S.] presidency,
they dismiss terrorism as a mere "nuisance."

That is one reason; the bonds between the two camps. The second is that on
the Left one finds a tendency to focus on terrorism – not on Islamism, not
on radical Islam. Terrorism is blamed on such problems as Western
colonialism of the past century, Western "neo-imperialism" of the present
day, Western policies—particularly in places like Iraq and the Palestinian
Authority. Or from unemployment, poverty, desperation.

I would contend that it actually results in an aggressive ideology. I
respect the role of ideas, and I believe that not to respect, to dismiss
them, to pay them no attention, is to patronize, and to possibly even to
be racist. There is no way to appease this ideology. It is serious, there
is no amount of money that can solve it, there is no change of foreign
policy that make it can go away.

I would argue to you, ladies and gentlemen, it must be fought and must be
defeated as in 1945 and 1991, [applause] as the German and the Soviet
threats were defeated. Our goal must be, in this case, the emergence of
Islam that is modern, moderate, democratic, humane, liberal, and good
neighborly. And that it is respectful of women, homosexuals, atheists,
whoever else. One that grants non-Muslims equal rights with Muslims.

In conclusion, Mr. Mayor, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, on the Left or on
the Right, I think you will agree with me on the importance of working
together to attain such an Islam. I suggest that this can be achieved not
via the get-along multiculturalism that you propose, but by standing firm
with our civilized allies around the globe. Especially with liberal
voices in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, with Iranian dissidents, and with
reformers in Afghanistan.

I also propose standing with their counterparts in the west, with such
individuals as Ayaan Hirsi Ali [applause], … formerly a Dutch legislator
and now in exile in the United States; with Irshad Manji, the Canadian
author; [applause] with Wafa Sultan, the Syrian in exile in the United
States who made her phenomenal appearance on Al-Jazeera. Individuals like
Magdi Allam, an Egyptian who is now a leading Italian journalist; Naser
Khader, a parliamentarian in Denmark; Salim Mansur, a professor and
author in Canada, and Irfan Al-Alawi, here in Britain. [applause]

Conversely, if we do not stand with these individuals, but instead if we
stand with those who would torment them, with the Islamists, with, I
might say, someone like Yusuf al- Qaradawi [applause] we are then
standing with those who justify suicide bombings, who defend the most
oppressive forms of Islamic practice, who espouse the clash of
civilizations [notion that] we ourselves reject.

To the extent that we all work together, against the barbarism of radical
Islam, a world civilization does indeed exist – one that transcends skin
colour, poverty, geography, politics, and religion.

I hope that you and I, Mr. Mayor, can agree here and now to cooperate on
such a program.

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"Betrayal: France, the Arabs, and the Jews"

Betrayal: France, the Arabs, and the Jews

A briefing by David Pryce-Jones
November 2, 2006
http://www.meforum.org/article/1636

David Pryce-Jones, senior editor of National Review, has also written for
the Daily Telegraph, Financial Times and the Spectator, while
contributing frequently to such publications as The Times of London, Wall
Street Journal, Commentary, and The New Republic. Pryce-Jones was educated
at Oxford and has taught at universities in California and Iowa. He has
authored nine novels and a dozen books of non-fiction. The latter treat
such themes as Middle Eastern politics and culture, the fall of the
Soviet Union, and literary biography and criticism. For more biographical
information, see http://www.davidpryce-jones.com. Mr. Pryce-Jones
addressed the Middle East Forum in New York on November 2, 2006.

The Middle East Forum presented the eminent author David Pryce-Jones to
discuss his new book, Betrayal: France, the Arabs, and the Jews
(Encounter, 2006). The goal in this study, he explained, was to "examine
the very strange behavior of the French" in their policy toward Arabs and
Jews since the nineteenth century. His narrative centers on the latter
half of the twentieth century, but with a look at its roots in France's
past.

Mr. Pryce-Jones pointed out a paradox in French left: As authors of the
Rights of Man and creators of the slogan Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité
(Liberty, Equality, Fraternity), the French left a legacy of democratic
ideals to the West. So why is it, he asks, that in international crises
throughout the last three or four decades, "the French have obstructed
every major Western initiative and policy, and although they declare
themselves to be acting in the name of peace, they are in fact
encouraging, at best confusion, and at worst, war, and violence."

In Mr. Pryce-Jones's view, the West is locked in a serious confrontation
with Islam, in which deep historic forces are at play. The fragmentation
of the Muslim world, including strife between Sunni and Sh'ia and among
groups within those sects, is cause for the eventual defeat of Islam. He
believes that the West can win the struggle, but only if it stays united.
He suggests that the French are "fragmenting us and nullifying our
efforts."

Two themes are woven throughout Betrayal: the French conceptions of the
Muslims and the Jews. The phrase "la France est une puissance musulmane"
(France is a Muslim power), which came into common usage during the reign
of Napoleon III and was repeated generation after generation by the French
regime, sparked Mr. Pryce-Jones's interest in French foreign policy. This
ran contrary to centuries of France billing itself as a Christian power
and basing its policies upon protecting the Christians in the Holy Land,
then part of the Ottoman Empire. The idea of France as a Muslim power,
Mr. Pryce-Jones argues, is "a fantasy – France is not a Muslim power and
cannot be a Muslim power. It is a mirage that France can take advantage
of Arabs and the Muslims and incorporate them into its imperial designs."
He suggests that the French borrowed the phrase from the British, who at
the same period thought of Britain as a Muslim power through its
colonization of India. The British knew, however!
, that
they were not a Muslim power, and that they were actually ruling the
Indians.

The French conception of the Jews, Mr. Pryce-Jones points out, derives
from the French Revolution. Quoting the Conte de Clermont-Tonnerre's
famous saying to the General Assembly, 'To the Jews as individuals
everything, to the Jews as a nation nothing', he notes that the French
attitude toward the Jews is defined by what the French think they ought
to be, not by how Jews define themselves. Mr. Pryce-Jones has documented
centuries of "astonishing anti-Jewish animus" in the archives of the Quai
d'Orsay. The tenor of the bias against the Jews is that they cannot act
independently; they are the pawns of a hostile external power which
varies along with the circumstances, be it the British, the Germans, or
the Russians.

Therefore, the rise of Zionism in the nineteenth century is a shock to the
French, who suddenly discover that the Jews have agency. The French do
everything they can to stifle Zionism, inventing conspiracy theories
blaming the Jews. The French sought to impede the creation of the Jewish
state, and later opposed Israeli foreign policy. Mr. Pryce-Jones traces
this "extraordinarily fantastic interpretation of what's going on in the
Arab world and in the Jewish world" among generations of French
diplomats, who "believe rubbish" despite their being among the most
sophisticated people in the world.

Mr. Pryce-Jones centers his account on the split in French foreign policy
circles during a brief period in the 1950s when French and Israeli
interests coincided. Arab nationalism threatened the French position in
North Africa and Israel during the Suez crisis. But while the French
Ministry of Defense supported Israel, the Quai d'Orsay did all it could
to stop the ministry's arms sales and pro-Israel attitude. By 1958, when
Charles De Gaulle came back to office, he adopted the Quai's viewpoint
and French foreign policy reverted to its anti-Israel position. By 1967,
the French were outright opponents of Israel.

The French supported Qaddafi, even selling him arms when they had
sanctions against Israel, but he was too unstable a figure on which to
base policy. So they chose Saddam Hussein and Yasir Arafat, who as Mr.
Pryce-Jones points out, "are the two pillars of French foreign policy.
Both Hussein and Arafat run strictly counter to every value France has
produced … they are a couple of bloodstained tyrants. They've done
nothing but damage to their own people and yet France has given Saddam
Hussein every opportunity," hosting him in France, selling Iraq billions
of arms he used against his own people, and funding the Osirak nuclear
plant which the Israelis had to destroy in 1981. But when Iran sponsored
terrorist attacks in France to protest France's support of Iraq, Mr.
Pryce-Jones explained, the French were surprised, thinking they had an
understanding with the Iranians not to retaliate while they supported
Iraq.

Mr. Pryce-Jones emphasizes France's disturbing role in bringing about the
Iranian Revolution, which he calls the "most important revolution in
modern times". France received Khomeini in 1978, when it was clear he was
planning an insurrection against the shah, and provided him lines of
communication through which to mobilize demonstrations. This is the most
dramatic example of the French penchant for harboring Islamic extremists,
Mr. Pryce-Jones points out, noting that they granted a safe haven to Haj
Amin el-Husseini, the mufti of Jerusalem, returning him to the Middle
East when he was wanted as a war criminal in 1945. He concludes that
"twice now the world has been handicapped by French-harbored monsters –
Haj Amin and Khomeini – who were fascists."

Mr. Pryce-Jones discussed the immigration of Muslims and Arabs into
France, which began after WWII and accelerated greatly after French
rights and welfare benefits were granted them in 1974. Today, Muslims
constitute 10 percent of the French population, not including illegal
immigrants. The problem, Mr. Pryce-Jones points out, is that the Muslim
population is not assimilated because the French government makes little
effort to integrate it, and Muslims live with 60-70 percent unemployment
in slummy suburbs with drug and crime problems. They live in a society
apart from the French, factors that contributed to the rioting and
violence in France in late 2005.

It is "safe to say that the French state lost control of these people, to
the Muslim street" which to the Jews of France is a serious matter. Some
Jewish reactions are reminiscent of the 1930s, with the chief rabbi
cautioning Jews not to wear their yarmulkes in the street. The French
state is critical of Israel, but "does everything appeasing and
surrendering to Arabs." The two themes – France as a "puissance
musulmane" and no nationality for the Jews – have collided, and as Mr.
Pryce-Jones notes, the French government has refused to stand by its
Jewish population.

Iran, which threatens genocide and death to Americans and Jews, will
present "a test of our whole civilization," says Mr. Pryce-Jones. France
is once again blocking U.S. efforts, choosing to appease a genocidal
state. During the July 2006 fighting in the Middle East, France stopped
short of siding with Hizbullah, but justified it and criticized Israel.

"To understand how France got into this muddle is the purpose of Betrayal,
how they have taken this position that the Jews are not a nation, must
never be a nation, while incorporating Muslims into their nation." The
problem, argues Mr. Pryce-Jones, is that the French "believe their own
fairy tale."

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Gallstones @ Batu Karang Natural Removal

REMOVING GALLSTONES NATURALLY
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It has worked for many. If it works for you please
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In my research in China, I came across some materials
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We all have gallstones. It's a matter of big or small,
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If it gets more serious, you feel pain in the liver
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"Even if you don't have any symptoms of gallstones,
you still might have some. It's always good to give
your gall bladder a clean-up now and then."

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In China all history is political

In China all history is political
By Kent Ewing

HONG KONG - Last year, China marked the 30th anniversary of Mao
Zedong's death with great fetes of veneration and tribute. But there
was no official mention of the millions who lost their lives as a
result of the Great Helmsman's famine-producing industrial policies,
brutal Chinese Communist Party (CCP) purges or the 10-year exercise
in persecution known as the Cultural Revolution. On Mao's dark side,
the state media were silent.

More of the same can be expected this year as Chinese intellectuals
gear up to mark the 50th anniversary of the anti-rightist movement
that led to the death or banishment of a half-million people for
speaking out against misguided Mao polices such as the Great Leap
Forward.

And this year, the party has an additional reason to tighten control
on the media. Its 17th CCP Congress is to be convened in the autumn,
and it is essential to maintain political and social stability. And
for the Communist Party, control on the media is a must for stability.

In a preemptive strike, the publicity department of the party's
Central Committee has warned state media off covering significant
historical events without first obtaining permission. This comes on
top of last year's advisory that the media should restrict coverage
of such events to official notices issued by the state-run Xinhua
News Agency.

Moreover, citing anonymous sources, the South China Morning Post
reported that the General Administration of Press and Publications
(GAPP) has banned the distribution or sale of eight books by
prominent writers and intellectuals and threatened publishers who
defy the ban with tough financial penalties. Tellingly, one of the
banned books, Past Stories of Peking Opera Stars, was written by
Zhang Yihe, daughter of former transport minister Zhang Bojun, who
was one of the chief targets of the anti-rightist campaign.

The ideological crackdown against Zhang Bojun and other intellectuals
came in reaction to the so-called Hundred Flowers Blooming Movement
in 1956-57, a period during which Mao invited criticism of the
government with the ostensible aim of improving policymaking. The
name of the movement was inspired by a poem that read: "Let a hundred
flowers bloom; let a hundred schools of thought contend."

Historians debate whether the movement was a trap or simply went
beyond what Mao had bargained for. Whatever the case, the purges that
followed saw many intellectuals who had criticized the party labeled
"rightists" and sentenced to re-education through labor or, in some
cases, death.

Zhang Bojun, dubbed the "No 1 rightist" at the time for advocating a
more democratic socialist system, died in 1969. Unlike some other
famous victims of the purge - for example, former premier Zhu Rongji
- he did not outlive Mao and was never rehabilitated into public
life. But his author-daughter has taken up his legacy in a number of
popular books she has written.

For her efforts, Zhang Yihe was given the Freedom to Write Award in
2004 by the Independent Chinese PEN Center for her book The Past Is
Not Like Smoke, a memoir explicitly about her father and other
intellectuals, such as Luo Longji, who were persecuted during the
anti-rightist campaign. The PEN selection committee said of Zhang's
book: "This kind of writing is not only an indictment of the age of
darkness, but it is also an affirmation of the indefatigable human
dignity and a negation of all attempts to destroy that dignity."

The book, even in its heavily edited form, was soon banned in China,
but an unexpurgated version, titled The Last Nobles, was published
with great success in Hong Kong, and pirated copies flourished on the
mainland. Zhang's A Memoir of Ma Lianliang was also banned on the
mainland because of its political content.

In a speech accepting the PEN award, Zhang said that while life for
intellectuals is much better in China today than during her father's
time, the country's breakneck economic growth poses a new threat to
its people: "The situation now is very different. Intellectuals are
living better, and they can express their own voices up to a point.

"But there is now another situation - many people are more interested
in pursuing material [wealth] rather than dispassionately
understanding the depth of humanity and the truth of life ... We seem
to have come out from one kind of totalitarianism, and we turned off
and walked right under another form of domination."

In a rare show of outrage for a Chinese author, Zhang issued a 1,000-
word attack on the GAPP after the ban of her most recent book, an
account of seven Peking opera stars who were friends of her family.
She told the Post that the ban "infringed my personal rights" of
freedom of expression and publication.

The other most recently banned titles represent an interesting cross-
section of China's bureaucratic paranoia - from I Object: The Road to
Politics by a People's Congress Member, journalist In China all
history is political
By Kent Ewing

Zhu Ling's account of peasant activist Yao Lifa's long struggle to
bring fair, democratic elections to a local legislature in Hubei
province, to Hu Fayun's This Is How It Goes@SARS.com, the story of a
woman whose obsession with the Internet during the SARS (severe acute
respiratory syndrome) crisis jeopardizes her relationship with a
local politician.

This week the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television took
the crusade for political correctness even further, ordering
satellite television networks to show only "ethically inspiring
dramas" during prime time. The order, which affects 48 national
channels, will be in force for eight months, starting in February. It
prohibits prime-time airing of imported cartoons and dramas, programs
involving crime, sex, divorce or legal cases, and dramas in local
dialects or even local accents.

With the censors' ambit spreading so far and wide, analysts point to
one clear message: Chinese leaders want to see nothing in the media
that could undermine President Hu Jintao's vision of a "harmonious
society" in the run-up to the CCP's 17th congress this autumn. The
congress is the first to be chaired by Hu, and no one is allowed to
spoil the party.

Hu took over the presidency from Jiang Zemin in 2003 and is also the
party's general secretary and head of the army. The congress, which
will witness substantial changes in leadership posts and set the
course for the country's development over the next five years, is
expected to be a crowning moment for him.

Ironically, when Hu assumed the presidency touted as a reformer,
there was hope of a new openness toward the media. Indeed, in tandem
with his call for better economic management, the new president
encouraged journalists to play a more aggressive watchdog role in
society by reporting on the epidemic of corruption and fraud that has
become a defining characteristic of Chinese bureaucracy.

But the new attitude was short-lived. According to the New York-based
Committee to Protect Journalists, Hu has presided over "a major
crackdown on the media".

That crackdown attracted international condemnation last year with
the jailing of New York Times researcher Zhao Yan and the chief China
correspondent for Singapore's Straits Times, Ching Cheong. Zhao was
sentenced to three years in prison on what was widely considered a
trumped-up charge of fraud, and Ching was jailed for five years for
selling state secrets to Taiwan in a verdict that was met with
disbelief by many of his fellow journalists.

Beijing's clampdown on editorial staff who work for local media has
attracted less attention but is no less real. Last year, editors were
sacked from three newspapers that dared to defy the censors' dictates
- the Beijing News, the Southern Metropolis News and the Public
Interest Times - and party propagandists also temporarily closed
Bingdian, a lively four-page weekly supplement to the state-run China
Youth Daily, because of its coverage of controversial issues.

In addition, the popular Beijing-based weekly newsmagazine Lifeweek
received a reprimand from the Propaganda Department for "defiance" of
the party mandate not to cover politically sensitive events. While
the department did not specify which event Lifeweek was "guilty" of
covering, it's a fair bet the censure was related to the magazine's
October 30 cover story on the 30th anniversary of the Cultural
Revolution, which featured a front-page photo of Jiang Qing, Mao's
wife and one of the notorious Gang of Four who led the long and
bloody purge.

Authorities have also shut down Internet blogs and chat forums that
have crossed the censors' line.

It's no surprise that Reporters Without Borders ranked China 159th
out of 167 countries in its world press-freedom index last year. And
while the country has promised to grant foreign journalists
unprecedented freedom of travel and coverage when China hosts the
Summer Olympic Games in 2008, that promise means nothing to Chinese
journalists, bloggers and authors who continue to be muzzled.

For a country that likes to lecture Japan and other nations about
facing up to their history, China still has a deep aversion to
reckoning with its own.

Kent Ewing is a teacher and writer at Hong Kong International School.
He can be reached at kewing@hkis.edu.hk .

(Copyright 2007 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)

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My Debate with London Mayor Ken Livingstone

It all began with a faxed letter from Ken Livingstone, mayor of London,
arriving out of the blue on April 4, 2006:

I will be hosting a conference to discuss the thesis of the "clash of
civilizations" first popularized by Professor Samuel Huntington's book,
The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. I would like
to invite you to debate this thesis with me at the opening session of the
conference, which will be held 10am-1pm on Saturday, 10 June 2006.

The conference was twice delayed, before finally taking place two days
ago, on January 20, 2007. It was quite an event, held in the Queen
Elizabeth II Conference Centre, across the street from Westminster Abbey.
The mayor told me in a private chat before the event that when he
conceived of the event two years ago, he wondered if anyone would show
up. He need not have worried; the Greater London Authority's website
indicated there had been "an unprecedented demand" for tickets and
several days in advance of the event shut the ticketing. One organizer on
the mayor's staff told me that the audience numbered about five thousand
and that over 150 media had registered for the conference.

The mayor and I each invited a seconder to help us make our arguments: he
chose Salma Yaqoob, a councillor in Birmingham, and I chose Douglas
Murray, the London writer. Due to the large crowd, the event started a
half hour late but even truncated, it still went for slightly over two
hours.

Despite the many journalists and video cameras, and despite the GLA having
recorded and simultaneously transcribed the event, and despite two and a
half days having passed since it took place, there has been – quite to my
surprise – not a single media account of the debate, nor a video made
available, nor a transcript. (This reminds me in a way of my University
of California-Berkeley talk three years ago, which created quite a stir
but had zero media coverage.)

There have, however, been a number of blog accounts – interestingly, every
one of them sympathetic to Murray and myself; it would seem that the
mayor's supporters took a pass on reporting the event. In alphabetical
order by author, here are are the fullest and most interesting accounts
that I have located (the list will be updated as needed):

* Sharon Chadha, "Clash of Civilizations?" SharonChadha.com, 21 January
2007.
* Gandalf, "Clash of Civilizations." UpPompeii.com, 21 January 2007.
* Graham, "A Very Civilised Clash." Harry's Place, 22 January 2007.
* Jonathan Hoffman, "Daniel Pipes survives Livingstone's Lions' Den."
Adloyada.com, 21 January 2007.
* David Pryce-Jones, "Debating Clash." National Review Online, 20 January
2007.
* Beila Rabinowitz and William A. Mayer, "Dr. Daniel Pipes and Douglas
Murray Triumph over 'Red' Ken Livingstone in London Debate."
PipeLineNews.org, 22 January 2007.

In anticipation of the video to follow, here are a couple of pictures from
the event, one of Ken Livingstone speaking, and one of me; from left to
right, the sequence is Douglas Murray, myself, Gavin Esler (the
moderator, a BBC television host), Ken Livingstone, and Salma Yaqoob.

(January 22, 2007)

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Importance of having breakfast...

"Importance of having Breakfast"

Breakfast can help prevent strokes, heart attack and sudden death. Advice on not to skip breakfast!

Healthy living
For those who always skip breakfast, you should stop that habit now! You've heard many times that "Breakfast is the most important meal of the day." Now, recent research confirms that one of the worst practices you can develop may be avoiding breakfast.

Why?


Because the frequency of heart attack, sudden death, and stroke peaks between 6:00a.m. and noon, with the highest incidence being
between 8: 00a.m. and 10:00a.m.What mechanism within the body could account for this significant jump in sudden death in the early
morning hours?

We may have an Answer.


Platelet, tiny elements in the blood that keep us from bleeding to Death if we get a cut, can clump together inside our arteries due to
cholesterol or plaque buildup in the artery lining. It is in the morning hours that platelets become the most activated and tend to form these internal blood clots at the greatest frequency.

However, eating even a very light breakfast prevents the morning platelet activation that is associated with heart attacks and strokes. Studies performed at Memorial University in St.Johns, Newfoundland found that eating a light, very low-fat breakfast was critical in modifying the morning platelet activation. Subjects in the study consumed either low-fat or fat-free yogurt, orange juice, fruit, and a source of protein coming from yogurt or fat-free milk. So if you skip breakfast, it's important that you change this practice immediately in light of this research. Develop a simple plan to eat cereal, such as oatmeal or Bran Flakes, along with six ounces of grape juice or orange juice, and perhaps a piece of fruit. This simple plan will keep your platelets from sticking together, keep blood clots from forming, and perhaps head off a potential Heart Attack or stroke. So never ever skip breakfast




.





---------------------------------



.


__,_._,___


---------------------------------
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                                                                                                                    "Importance of having Breakfast"

Breakfast can help prevent strokes, heart attack and sudden death. Advice on not to skip breakfast!

Healthy living
For those who always skip breakfast, you should stop that habit now! You've heard many times that "Breakfast is the most important meal of the day." Now, recent research confirms that one of the worst practices you can develop may be avoiding breakfast.

Why?


Because the frequency of heart attack, sudden death, and stroke peaks between 6:00a.m. and noon, with the highest incidence being
between 8: 00a.m. and 10:00a.m.What mechanism within the body could account for this significant jump in sudden death in the early
morning hours?

We may have an Answer.


Platelet, tiny elements in the blood that keep us from bleeding to Death if we get a cut, can clump together inside our arteries due to
cholesterol or plaque buildup in the artery lining. It is in the morning hours that platelets become the most activated and tend to form these internal blood clots at the greatest frequency.

However, eating even a very light breakfast prevents the morning platelet activation that is associated with heart attacks and strokes. Studies performed at Memorial University in St.Johns,    Newfoundland found that eating a light, very low-fat breakfast was critical in modifying the morning platelet activation. Subjects in the study consumed either low-fat or fat-free yogurt, orange juice, fruit, and a source of protein coming from yogurt or fat-free milk. So if you skip breakfast, it's important that you change this practice immediately in light of this research. Develop a simple plan to eat cereal, such as oatmeal or Bran Flakes, along with six ounces of grape juice or orange juice, and perhaps a piece of fruit. This simple plan will keep your platelets from sticking together, keep blood clots from forming, and perhaps head off a potential Heart Attack or stroke. So never ever skip breakfast

.

---

 

.

__,_._,___

---

Want to start your own business? Learn how on Yahoo! Small Business.
--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Sangkancil" group.
To post to this group, send email to sangkancil@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to sangkancil-unsubscribe@googlegroups.com
For more options, visit this group at http://groups-beta.google.com/group/sangkancil?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

"Importance of
having Breakfast"

Breakfast can help prevent strokes, heart attack and sudden death. Advice
on not to skip breakfast!

Healthy living
For those who always skip breakfast, you should stop that habit now!
You've heard many times that "Breakfast is the most important meal of the
day." Now, recent research confirms that one of the worst practices you
can develop may be avoiding breakfast.

Why?

Because the frequency of heart attack, sudden death, and stroke peaks
between 6:00a.m. and noon, with the highest incidence being
between 8: 00a.m. and 10:00a.m.What mechanism within the body could
account for this significant jump in sudden death in the early
morning hours?

We may have an Answer.

Platelet, tiny elements in the blood that keep us from bleeding to Death
if we get a cut, can clump together inside our arteries due to
cholesterol or plaque buildup in the artery lining. It is in the morning
hours that platelets become the most activated and tend to form these
internal blood clots at the greatest frequency.

However, eating even a very light breakfast prevents the morning platelet
activation that is associated with heart attacks and strokes. Studies
performed at Memorial University in St.Johns, Newfoundland found that
eating a light, very low-fat breakfast was critical in modifying the
morning platelet activation. Subjects in the study consumed either
low-fat or fat-free yogurt, orange juice, fruit, and a source of protein
coming from yogurt or fat-free milk. So if you skip breakfast, it's
important that you change this practice immediately in light of this
research. Develop a simple plan to eat cereal, such as oatmeal or Bran
Flakes, along with six ounces of grape juice or orange juice, and perhaps
a piece of fruit. This simple plan will keep your platelets from sticking
together, keep blood clots from forming, and perhaps head off a potential
Heart Attack or stroke. So never ever skip breakfast

----------------------------------------------------------------
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"How to make '07 Ahmadinejad's last year in power"

How to make '07 Ahmadinejad's last year in power

by Michael Rubin
New York Daily News
January 3, 2007
http://www.meforum.org/article/1071

In Iran, demonstrations are an art form. First, the government buses in
state workers. Next, officials distribute banners with revolutionary
slogans. Finally, state television reports a spontaneous rally in support
of the Islamic Republic.

Stage-managed demonstrations, though, mask weakness. On Dec. 11, a group
of students interrupted a speech by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
with chants of "Death to the Dictator." On Jan. 2, a demonstrator in Ahvaz
waved a placard condemning inflation, unemployment and crime. Recent
elections rebuked hardliners.

And unfortunately, rather than find a way to capitalize on such weakness,
up to now, a desire for diplomacy has blinded the West. Between 2000 and
2005, European diplomats preaching engagement tripled trade with Iran.
Tehran pumped 70% of the resulting hard currency windfall into its
nuclear and military programs. After Secretary of State Rice offered
dialogue with Iran, the regime announced it would redouble its nuclear
efforts. Ahmadinejad said yesterday he would "humiliate" the United
States.

European diplomats declare their strategy to be working, but privately say
a nuclear Iran is inevitable. Last month's partial UN sanctions are only
symbolic. Effectiveness requires comprehensive sanctions - which
diplomats could lift in response to compliance.

But the UN is feckless. If President Bush is sincere when he says the U.S.
"will not tolerate" a nuclear-armed Iran, Washington may have to act
alone. This need not mean military action, but rather willingness to
exploit Iranian weakness.

The Islamic Republic is under tremendous pressure. A recent Johns Hopkins
University report predicts Iran's oil industry could collapse within a
decade because of poor management and disintegrating infrastructure.
Already, the Islamic Republic must import 40% of its fuel needs. The
Iranian economy is unable to provide jobs for 700,000 young people
entering the market annually. The World Bank estimates that Iran's GDP is
30% below its 1970s levels. Experts estimate 5 million Iranians are
addicted to drugs. Prostitution has skyrocketed as poverty spreads.

The White House should exploit the growing cracks in Iranian society. Just
as Ronald Reagan championed striking shipyard workers in Poland in 1981,
so too should Bush support independent Iranian trade unions. Forcing the
regime to be accountable to its people both betters the lives of ordinary
Iranians and undercuts Ahmadinejad's Dr. Strangelove fantasies. In Iran,
wildcat strikes helped launch the Islamic Revolution; so too might they
end it.

It is wrongheaded to criticize Bush's Axis of Evil rhetoric. Not only does
straight talk dampen European willingness to invest in Iranian industry,
but the willingness of Iranian democrats to speak out has grown in
proportion to all the White House talk about freedom. Peace activists
should applaud such effective, nonmilitary action.

Finally, U.S. public diplomacy should prioritize information over pop
music. The Iranian regime would be hard-pressed to dismiss as propaganda
stories of unrest and corruption originating in local Iranian papers and
amplified by the Voice of America into national news.

Military action against Iran would be a tragedy, but need only occur if
U.S. policy remains a muddle. Here the White House and new Congress are
fortunate. If they play their cards well, this year could be
Ahmadinejad's last.

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The Middle East and Islam Dominate U.S. Public Life

It's about as official as can be: in the words of an Associated Press
end-of-year story, "Events in the Mideast shaped much of how we
[Americans] viewed 2006."

As voted by AP members, only one of the top 10 news stories of 2006 (#5,
Congressional scandals) had nothing to do with the Middle East. Five of
them were entirely Middle Eastern or Muslim in content (#1 Iraq; #6
Saddam Hussein convicted and executed, #7 the still-unnamed Lebanon war
during the summer, #9 the London airliner plot, #10 the disaster in
Darfur). Four of them were in substantial part Middle Eastern or Muslim
(#2 the U.S. elections, #3 nuclear standoffs with North Korea and Iran,
#4 illegal immigration, #7 Donald Rumsfeld resigns as secretary of
defense).

Comments: (1) This domination of the news is not a sudden thing but has
been building over decades; though less dramatic the case, I recall the
Middle East having an outsized media presence when I entered the field in
1969 – and that was before several Arab-Israeli wars, the 1973-74 oil
crisis the Iranian revolution, the Kuwait war, and other mega-events.

(2) This prominence does not mean that the Middle East and Muslims are
more important than other regions and peoples, but that they are more in
ferment. Little breaking news came out of the Soviet Union in its time or
China today, but endless twists and turns take place in – and are reported
prominently from – Gaza or Iraq. (December 31, 2006)

***************************************

Islamists in the Hospital Ward

A number of incidents are showing the deep incompatibility of radical
Islam with modern medicine. Here are a trio to get this blog going, with
more examples to be listed, in reverse chronological order, as they
occur:

A typical anti-bacterial gel found in UK hospitals.

Muslim visitors refuse anti-bacterial gel: British hospitals offer
dispensers with anti-bacterial gel outside wards so that visitors can be
sure not to bring in such infections as MRSA and PVL. But the gel
contains alcohol, prompting some Muslims to refuse to use the hand
cleansers on religious grounds. A National Health Service employee,
Theresa Poupa told in December 2006 of her experience visiting a sick
relative at the London Chest Hospital:

I could not believe it - the signs are large enough and clear enough but
they just took no notice and walked straight onto the ward. I was there
almost every day for three weeks and I saw it repeated dozens and dozens
of times. When I raised the matter with the nursing staff they just
shrugged and said that Muslims were refusing to use the gel because it
contained alcohol. They said they couldn't force visitors to use the gel
and I understand that — but I was astonished that anyone who didn't wash
their hands was allowed onto a ward. I know the dangers that bugs like
MRSA can cause. They kill hundreds of patients a year.

Male refused treatment by female doctors: A 17-year-old male shepherd from
Konya, Turkey, referred to only as "A.G.," arrived at the Konya Testing
Hospital complaining of swollen testicles. He was sent to get ultrasound
tests, but two headscarved (i.e., Islamist) female radiology doctors
refused him service. Not receiving proper attention, A.G. later had one
of his testicles removed by operation. The case has provoked much
attention. The hospital's head of urology, Celal Tutuncu, portrayed the
case as very "black and white," and said that action would be taken.
Members of the opposition CHP party raised the case in parliament in
December 2006. A CHP lawyer, Atilla Kart, noted that "This is the
destruction wrought by religious references spilling over into public
administration."

Male relatives preventing female patients from being treated by male
doctors: So rampant is the problem in France of Muslim husbands
preventing their wives and other female relatives from being treated by
male doctors (for example, women in labor have not had epidurals because
the anesthetist was a man) that Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin
reportedly planned in February 2004 to propose legislation to stop this
from happening (how he plans to do this is not explained). (December 29,
2006)

***************************************

Mosque in Cordoba, Church in Damascus

Spain's Islamic Board wrote a letter to Pope Benedict XVI to be allowed to
pray in Cordoba Cathedral, on the grounds that the building was originally
a mosque before being transformed into a church in the thirteenth century.
"What we wanted was not to take over that holy place," reads the Islamic
Board's letter, "but to create in it, together with you and other faiths,
an ecumenical space unique in the world which would have been of great
significance in bringing peace to humanity."

The Islamic Board took this initiative after senior Catholic clergy
announced they "did not recommend" this step and indeed declared
themselves unprepared to permit the cathedral's shared use with any other
faith. On an operational level, security guards in the cathedral are said
often to prevent Muslims from praying inside the medieval mosque that
surrounds its church structure.

The Islamic Board's general secretary, Mansur Escudero, complained that
some in the Church feel threatened by Spain's growing Muslim population.
"There are reactionary elements within the Catholic Church, and when they
hear about the construction of a mosque, or Muslim teachings in state
schools, or about veils, they see it as a sign we are growing and they
oppose it."

Comment: The Muslim demand is all very reasonable – but only if Muslims
permit reciprocal rights to Christians. For example, the Umayyad Mosque
in Damascus is built over a Byzantine church and to this day contains a
shrine said to contain the head of John the Baptist; Christians should be
granted leave to pray there. Or the grandest church of Byzantium, Hagia
Sophia in Istanbul, for centuries a mosque and now a museum – it too
should be made available for Christian services. The Vatican has made
reciprocity the cornerstone of its relations with Muslims, and this looks
like a simple place to start implementing that policy.

St John's Shrine, which is inside the Umayyad Mosque, Damascus.
(December 26, 2006)

***************************************

Is the Hatay Problem Solved?

Ever since the French government ceded the Alexandretta province of Syria
to Turkey in 1939, its control by Ankara has been a sore, obstructing the
two countries' relations and at times exacerbating crises between them,
most recently in 1998.

Hatay, a province of Turkey since 1939. Alexandretta (or Iskanderun) is
its capital.

It therefore came as a bombshell to read yesterday an article by Yoav
Stern, "Turkey singing a new tune," in the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz
that the 66-year-old problem has been solved, and all the more so as the
news comes bye-the-bye in an article about Turkish-Israeli relations.

The question asked by Channel 2's analyst for Arab affairs, Ehud Ya'ari,
brought a satisfied smile to the face of Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom
at the joint press conference held last Tuesday in Jerusalem with Turkish
Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul. Ya'ari asked the most interesting question
at the press conference, which touched on the territorial conflict
between Syria and Turkey. "Can Syria's recognition last month of full
Turkish sovereignty over the Hatay province be seen as a precedent for
the case of the Golan Heights?" Ya'ari asked.

Everyone waited suspense fully for an answer from Gul, who immediately
perceived a trap. He answered with diplomatic finesse, without batting an
eyelid: "The two cases are not similar, there is no territorial
disagreement between Turkey and Syria, and in the second case, the United
Nations determined that the territory is occupied."

The question illustrates the way in which Turkey's relations with Syria
resemble Israeli-Syrian relations. On the territorial level, there is a
long-standing conflict between the two countries, which was finally
resolved last month, away from the eyes of the media. The conflict
involved a region known as the Hatay province in Turkey and Alexandretta
in Syria. Conquered in 1938 by the Turkish army, the Turks view it as an
inseparable part of their country. The Syrians view it as a part of their
homeland that was torn away with the consent of the French during the
Mandate period, before the Syrians achieved independence. The Syrians
point to the Arab residents of the region to bolster their claim.

Ever since Syrian independence in 1946, the area has been a source of
constant tension. Until last month. Turkey and Syria spent a year and a
half preparing a free-trade agreement between the two countries. Two
Syrian prime ministers and the president - Mohammed Mustafa Mero, Naji
al-Otari and Bashar Assad - visited Ankara. Turkish Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan paid a return visit last month and finally signed an
agreement in Damascus.

Even more surprisingly, this Ha'aretz article was cited today as a source
of information on the agreement by the Turkish newspaper Hürriyet,
implying that the Turkish press knew nothing of this major accord,
apparently signed on December 22.

Looking back on the coverage of that summit meeting, one finds just hints
of such a deal. Here is Burak Akıncı's account for Agence
France-Presse, dated December 22 and titled "Turkey, Syria sign
free-trade accord amid warming ties on Erdogan visit."

Former foes Turkey and Syria signed a free-trade accord and said they had
agreed to put their differences behind them during a visit Wednesday by
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Erdogan, at the start of a
two-day mission, and his Syrian counterpart Mohammed Naji Otri signed the
deal, which had been under negotiation for several years. …

A Turkish diplomatic source said Damascus lifted its reservations to
signing the trade deal "after a certain accord" was reached on Turkey's
sovereignty in the southern province of Hatay, formerly Alexandretta, on
which Syria had claims.

Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Syrian president
Bashshar al-Asad, getting along.

This all very elusive. Two questions come to mind: (1) How can such a
major development not be reported on? One imagines that the Syrian regime
is not exactly eager to have the news reported on, while the Turk
leadership is willing to keep quiet about its victory, if that is the
price it must pay. (2) Where exactly do things stand on Hatay? Has Bashar
Assad given up Syrian claims in perpetuity, or something lesser? Has the
claim been removed from schoolbooks, government maps, political rhetoric,
and so on?

Comment: If the Syrians really have abandoned this claim, it was
foreshadowed already four years ago. Here is Syrian Foreign Minister
Faruq al-Shara, quoted in an Agence France-Presse report from February 5,
2001 (not online):

Asked about Damascus' claims over the southern Turkish province of Hatay,
which is often shown as Syrian territory on Syrian maps, Shara said that
"maybe several years" were needed to settle the problem. "Issues that
seem sensitive today, could be easily resolved in the future when the
bilateral climate reaches a level at which they will not pose
difficulties," the Syrian minister said. "It is wrong to give priorities
to such issues now becuase this could harm cooperation in other fields
... In the end they will be resolved, but we should not push more than we
have to."

(January 10, 2005)

Jan. 24, 2005 update: Ehud Ya'ari, cited above, has fleshed out the
picture in his Jerusalem Report column dated today, "Syrian Overture"
(not online):

For years I've made it a rule to read every article that political
columnist Rosanna Boumunsef writes in An-Nahar, Lebanon's most important
daily. She knows what she's talking about and writes with precision.

So too with her column of December 28, following the visit of Turkish
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Syria. She quotes Lebanese Druse
leader Walid Jumblatt, who of late has become the most vocal spokesman
for opponents of Syrian rule in his country: "Syria has gotten over its
Alexandretta complex," Jumblatt asserted, "and agreed to having Europe on
its border." In other words, Syria has given up its 65-year-old claim to
the sanjak (province) of Alexandretta (Iskanderun) on the Mediterranean
coast, realizing that with Turkey due to join the European Union, there
is no chance whatsoever of returning the province to Arab rule.

Alexandretta was given up by Syria's mandatory ruler, France, in 1939 and
annexed by Turkey, which renamed the province Hatay. Turkish settlement
in the region totally changed the demographic balance, reducing the
relative size of the Arab minority. A year ago Syrian leader Bashar
al-Asad visited Ankara for the first time, and he carefully avoided
saying a word about the contested territory. Since then there's been a
rapid rapprochement between the two countries, which as recently as 1998
were on the verge of war because of Syria's support for the Kurdish
rebellion led by the PKK. Recently, when Erdogan visited Damascus in
turn, an agreement was signed on jointly building a dam on the Orontes
River on the border between Alexandretta and Syria - putting an official
seal on Syria's acceptance of the loss of the sanjak.

Boumunsef quotes Asad as saying in private conversations with several of
his guests that he is proud of his success at establishing warm ties with
Turkey "despite the sharp territorial dispute." Asad added that "in this
framework, Syria can reach peace with Israel as well." What did he mean
by that? It's not clear, but Boumunsef cautiously asks, "Is the meaning
of these statements that flexibility is possible in dealing with other
issues, similar to his pragmatic approach to Alexandretta?"

That is: Could it be that one day Syria will deal with the Golan Heights
as it is now dealing with Alexandretta?

Let's stress: Syria has not signed on to any concession concerning
Alexandretta. In principle, it maintains its claim to sovereignty there.
But one official commentator, Imad Shu'eibi, head of the Center for
Strategic Studies in Damascus, has made clear that in fact it's been
decided to "put off for coming generations" the dream of Syrian
Alexandretta, and to not let the dispute prevent cooperation in other
areas.

The Syrians have a very hard time explaining in public their surrender to
the Turks. They are also signaling that the Golan is different. Foreign
Minister Farouk Al-Shara has even made a point of correcting the
impression that Asad is ready for negotiations "without preconditions,"
and has explained that insisting on a return to the June 4, 1967 lines is
not a "condition" but a "legitimate necessity."

But one cannot avoid concluding from the Alexandretta business that Syria
does not regard its borders as eternally sacred. And not only has it
accepted the loss of Alexandretta, but in a border agreement signed last
month with Jordan, Damascus adopted another principle: Demography can
result in border corrections. Syria got Jordan's assent to annexing land
along the Yarmuk River where Syrian peasants settled after the Syrian
invasion of Jordan in Black September, 1970, and in exchange gave up land
to Jordan in other areas.

Asad's pragmatic flexibility on borders may indicate that wider strategic
concerns are getting preference over the old slogans about holding on to
"every grain of sand" and the oaths never to forget "usurped" land. So
there is reason to see whether the young president is willing to consider
cautiously a change in Syria's stance toward Israel without demanding that
withdrawal from the Golan be the first, immediate, topic on the agenda.

Ya'ari then goes on the consider the implications of the the Hatay
recognition for the Golan Heights and Israel.

May 28, 2005 update: In a news item on a Syrian missile that malfunctioned
and exploded in southern Hatay, Agence France-Presse gives a little
background on Hatay: Syria and Turkey, it writes, "share a long border,
and Hatay, which is claimed by Syria, is at its western end." Reiterating
this point, AFP notes that, "Despite the improved ties between the two
countries, two sticking points remain: the waters of the Euphrates River,
which has its source in Turkey, and the status of Hatay."

Comment: Either Agence France-Presse has forgotten its own reporting (see
its December 22, 2004 coverage from Damascus, quoted above) or the
Syrians still are claiming Hatay. Which is it?

Dec. 22, 2006 update: Two years after the signing of this accord, the
Syrian tourism ministry still shows a map that claims Hatay as an
integral part of the Syrian Arab Republic.

Map on the Syrian Ministry of Tourism website. (This identical map appears
whether one uses the English, French, or Arabic versions of the website.)

Comment: Is Damascus playing the same game with Ankara that the Arabs do
all the time with Jerusalem, that is, sign an agreement and then ignore
it?

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Pipes explains "How the West Could Lose" in NY Sun

Dear Reader:

I will be William E. Simon distinguished visiting professor at Pepperdine
University in Malibu, California, during the spring semester of 2007.
(For the press release on my appointment, see "School of Public Policy
Announces 2007 Distinguished Visiting Professor.")

To prepare for teaching, and also to take a break after 285 straight
weeks, I am suspending this column for the next 15 weeks, from early
January to mid-April. I plan to resume it on April 17.

Yours sincerely, Daniel Pipes

---------------------------------------------
How the West Could Lose

by Daniel Pipes
New York Sun
December 26, 2006
http://www.danielpipes.org/article/4227

After defeating fascists and communists, can the West now defeat the
Islamists?

On the face of it, its military preponderance makes victory seem
inevitable. Even if Tehran acquires a nuclear weapon, Islamists have
nothing like the military machine the Axis deployed in World War II, nor
the Soviet Union during the cold war. What do the Islamists have to
compare with the Wehrmacht or the Red Army? The SS or Spetznaz? The
Gestapo or the KGB? Or, for that matter, to Auschwitz or the gulag?

Yet, more than a few analysts, including myself, worry that it's not so
simple. Islamists (defined as persons who demand to live by the sacred
law of Islam, the Sharia) might in fact do better than the earlier
totalitarians. They could even win. That's because, however strong the
Western hardware, its software contains some potentially fatal bugs.
Three of them – pacifism, self-hatred, complacency – deserve attention.

Pacifism: Among the educated, the conviction has widely taken hold that
"there is no military solution" to current problems, a mantra applied in
every Middle East problem – Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, the Kurds,
terrorism, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. But this pragmatic pacifism
overlooks the fact that modern history abounds with military solutions.
What were the defeats of the Axis, the United States in Vietnam, or the
Soviet Union in Afghanistan, if not military solutions?

Self-hatred: Significant elements in several Western countries –
especially the United States, Great Britain, and Israel – believe their
own governments to be repositories of evil, and see terrorism as just
punishment for past sins. This "we have met the enemy and he is us"
attitude replaces an effective response with appeasement, including a
readiness to give up traditions and achievements. Osama bin Laden
celebrates by name such leftists as Robert Fisk and William Blum.
Self-hating Westerners have an out-sized importance due to their
prominent role as shapers of opinion in universities, the media,
religious institutions, and the arts. They serve as the Islamists'
auxiliary mujahideen.

Complacency: The absence of an impressive Islamist military machine imbues
many Westerners, especially on the left, with a feeling of disdain.
Whereas conventional war – with its men in uniform, its ships, tanks, and
planes, and its bloody battles for land and resources – is simple to
comprehend, the asymmetric war with radical Islam is elusive. Box cutters
and suicide belts make it difficult to perceive this enemy as a worthy
opponent. With John Kerry, too many dismiss terrorism as a mere
"nuisance."

Islamists deploy formidable capabilities, however, that go far beyond
small-scale terrorism:

* A potential access to weapons of mass destruction that could devastate
Western life.
* A religious appeal that provides deeper resonance and greater staying
power than the artificial ideologies of fascism or communism.
* An impressively conceptualized, funded, and organized institutional
machinery that successfully builds credibility, goodwill, and electoral
success.
* An ideology capable of appealing to Muslims of every size and shape,
from Lumpenproletariat to privileged, from illiterates to Ph.D.s, from
the well-adjusted to psychopaths, from Yemenis to Canadians. The movement
almost defies sociological definition.
* A non-violent approach – what I call "lawful Islamism" – that pursues
Islamification through educational, political, and religious means,
without recourse to illegality or terrorism. Lawful Islamism is proving
successful in Muslim-majority countries like Algeria and Muslim-minority
ones like the United Kingdom.
* A huge number of committed cadres. If Islamists constitute 10% to 15%
of the Muslim population worldwide, they number some 125 to 200 million
persons, or a far greater total than all the fascists and communists,
combined, who ever lived.

Pacifism, self-hatred and complacency are lengthening the war against
radical Islam and causing undue casualties. Only after absorbing
catastrophic human and property losses will left-leaning Westerners
likely overcome this triple affliction and confront the true scope of the
threat. The civilized world will likely then prevail, but belatedly and at
a higher cost than need have been.

Should Islamists get smart and avoid mass destruction, but instead stick
to the lawful, political, non-violent route, and should their movement
remain vital, it is difficult to see what will stop them.

Mr. Pipes (www.DanielPipes.org) is director of the Middle East Forum and
author of Miniatures (Transaction Publishers). This column will be on
hiatus for the next 15 weeks, until mid-April, while Mr. Pipes teaches at
Pepperdine University in Malibu, California.

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Who Owns Kirkuk? The Turkoman Case

Who Owns Kirkuk? The Turkoman Case

by Yücel Güçlü
Middle East Quarterly
Winter 2007
http://www.meforum.org/article/1074

The question of Kirkuk's final status remains among the touchiest issues
concerning Iraq's future. The Iraqi Kurdish political parties seek to
include Kirkuk in a federal Kurdish state, an outcome at odds with Iraqi
Turkoman sensitivities. The Turkomans consider Kirkuk to be their own
ancestral capital and cultural center. Understanding the Turkoman claim
to Kirkuk is essential to defuse a potentially explosive problem.

Policymakers and commentators outside Turkey often ignore the Turkomans.
Literature about them is scarce in Western languages; the little that
exists is limited in academic rigor and utility.[1] Furthermore, in terms
of enunciating their concerns and interacting with Western officials, the
Turkomans themselves have not always been effective spokesmen for their
cause.

For centuries, the Turkomans have been part of the urban elite in cities
such as Baghdad, Mosul, and Kirkuk. They remain an integral part of Iraq
although their population is debated. It is hard to come by adequate
population numbers in Iraq. After the 1958 revolution and the Baath Party
coup ten years later, successive Iraqi governments embraced Arab
nationalism[2] and worked to subvert the rights of the Kurdish and
Turkoman communities. The last reliable census in Iraq—and the only one
in which participants could declare their mother tongue—was in 1957. It
found that Turkomans were the third largest ethnicity in Iraq, after
Arabs and Kurds. The Turkomans numbered 567,000 out of a total population
of 6,300,000. Later polls dropped "Turkoman" as a category. Basing his
estimate on the 1957 census data and a growth rate of 2.5 percent
annually, Erşat Hürmüzlü, a Kirkuk-born Turkoman scholar, estimated
Iraq's Turkoman population today at no less than two million Turkomans,!
out of a total population of 25 million.[3]

The City of Kirkuk

The status of Kirkuk remains one of Iraq's major flash points. A city of
more than 750,000[4] in the center of northern Iraq, it sits adjacent to
oil fields holding 40 percent of Iraq's reserves[5] and is surrounded by
some of Iraq's richest agricultural land. Kirkuk's history is complex,
replete with competing claims to suzerainty.

Kirkuk's history dates back thousands of years.[6] The Ottoman Empire
incorporated Kirkuk—and much of what is now Iraq—into its domains in
1534. Kirkuk grew in importance in the eighteenth century when it became
the capital of the Ottoman sanjak (county or sub-district) of
Şehrizor, comprising the areas of Kirkuk, Arbil, and Sulaimaniya.
With the reforms of Midhat Pasha, Baghdad's governor between 1869 and
1872, the name Şehrizor was given to the sanjak of Kirkuk
(corresponding to the present areas of Kirkuk and Arbil). In 1879, the
Ottoman government in Istanbul created the Mosul vilayet, which
incorporated most of what is now northern Iraq. Kirkuk remained an
important garrison town and, for reasons of language and the composition
of the population, a valuable Ottoman recruiting center for civil
servants and gendarmes. Ottoman culture thrived in the city.[7] The
Turkomans dominated the merchant class and provided economic stability to
the city.

Following its defeat in World War I, the Ottoman Empire forfeited much of
its territory in the Middle East. But, because the majority of the area
of Kirkuk was Turkish, the Ottoman government refused to renounce its
claim. The Sublime Porte based its claim on President Woodrow Wilson's
Fourteen Points, Article XII of which stipulated that the Turkish
portions of the Ottoman Empire should be assured sovereignty. The Ottoman
delegation to the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 argued that in "Asia the
Turkish lands are bounded on the south by the provinces of Mosul and
Diyarbekir, as well as a part of Aleppo as far as the Mediterranean."[8]

At this time, Kirkuk's leading families were Turkoman: the Neftçiler—whose
name in Turkish means oil producer—had owned and exploited the oil
seepages since a 1693 imperial decree; the Yakuboğulları were
landowners; and the Kırdars were both landowners and merchants. In
addition, the city was home to scores of soldiers and civil servants who
had reached high office in the Ottoman service but retired to their home
province after the Allies dismembered the empire. The Turkomans retained
the position of social influence they had enjoyed under Ottoman rule.[9]
Indeed, Turkish remained the language of communication not only within
the sanjak but also in Baghdad. The only local newspaper was the Turkish
Necme, and there was an association of Turkoman writers. A.F. Miller, the
resident British assistant administrative inspector, could only speak
Turkish; he had little need for Arabic or Kurdish. And the British vice
consul in Mosul, H.E. Wilkie Young, wrote, "There a!
re 7,000 houses in the town of Kirkuk, and the population is not less
than 40,000, of whom about 2,500 are Jews and only 630 Christians. The
rest are Moslems of Turkoman origin. The language of the place is
consequently Turkish."[10] W.R. Hay, another British political officer in
northern Iraq, likewise described a Turkoman crescent stretching from
Mosul through Kirkuk and southward to Mandali. He described how "Kirkuk
is the main centre of this Turkish population … Several villages in its
vicinity are also Turkish-speaking, whereas the other towns are isolated
communities surrounded by Kurds and Arabs. Large numbers of the
middle-class Turks of Kirkuk and Arbil who possess some land, but wish to
augment their incomes, learn to read and write, wear European clothes and
undertake appointments in the government service. Kirkuk and Arbil,
especially the former, provided large numbers of officials to the Ottoman
government."[11] That the British government drew up its proclamat!
ions to the city's residents in the same Turkish language used!
at the
time in Istanbul[12] was a testament to Kirkuk's Turkish character.

Britain, as the occupying power, sought to legitimize its imposition of
the Hashemite monarchy on the country through popular vote. During the
July 1921 referendum, the people of Kirkuk rejected both inclusion in the
new kingdom of Iraq and Faisal, the British choice for king. Kirkuk
officials did not take part in the August 23, 1921 proclamation ceremony
for Faisal. Rather than turn toward Baghdad, Kirkuk's population
continued to identify with Turkey.[13] Sir Arnold Wilson, the first
British high commissioner of Iraq (1917-20) observed, "Kirkuk had always
been a stronghold of Turkish officialdom, and pro-Turkish views here were
a disturbing element for the occupation forces."[14] Gertrude Bell, who
would serve as Oriental secretary to the British civil administrator and
later to the high commissioner of Iraq, acknowledged Kirkuk's Turkish
character: "The inhabitants of Kirkuk are largely of Turkish blood,
descendants of Turkish settlers dating from the time of Seljuks." [1!
5]

In order to persuade Kirkuk's notables to participate in elections for
Iraq's new Constituent Assembly, the British high commissioner appointed
a Turkoman sub-governor (mutasarrıf) and other Turkoman officials to
top administrative posts in Kirkuk. London wanted Kirkuk to accede to 1923
elections organized by the British to bestow legitimacy upon the new
rulers in Baghdad. The Kirkuk residents made their participation in the
electoral process conditional on four provisions: (1) non-interference of
the government in local electoral procedures; (2) the preservation of the
district administration's Turkish character; (3) recognition of Turkish
as the district's official language; and (4) the appointment of Kirkukis
in all subsequent Baghdad cabinets.[16] When Sayyid Abd al-Rahman
al-Gaylani formed his first Iraqi cabinet on October 25, 1920, his
minister of education and health was İzzet Pasha, a retired Turkoman
general from Kirkuk.[17]

In July 1923, Prime Minister 'Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa'dun sent a telegram in
Turkish to the sub-governor confirming that the Council of Ministers in
Baghdad had accepted conditions two and three. While this did not go far
enough for Kirkuk's local notables, it nevertheless constituted Baghdad's
de facto recognition of their authority.[18]

On September 30, 1924, the League of Nations set up a commission to decide
on the future of the Mosul vilayet. The commission spent some two months
in the disputed area visiting the principal localities, speaking to local
notables and other residents. It did not equate language with loyalty and,
indeed, found that many Arabic speakers considered themselves loyal more
to Turkey than Iraq. Nor did the commission find any merit to British
claims that there was a distinction between Turks and Turkomans.[19] It
was not until Turkish, British, and Iraqi representatives in Ankara
signed a tripartite treaty on June 5, 1926, that the three countries
finalized the status of the Mosul vilayet, assigning the region—including
Kirkuk—to Iraq.

Prior to granting Iraq independence, the British-supervised Iraqi
government sought to compel the Arab majority to respect minority rights.
The Iraqi parliament enacted Local Languages Law No. 74, 1931, to make
Kurdish and Turkish official languages in various northern districts
including Kirkuk. The law also stipulated that the language of
instruction should be that of the majority of pupils. The law
acknowledged both Kirkuk and Kifri to be majority Turkoman.[20]

As condition of acceptance into the League of Nations, the Iraqi
government on May 30, 1932, specified areas where minority languages,
local administration, law courts, and primary education were to function.
This declaration was incorporated into the constitution of 1925 with the
reaffirmation of Iraq's undertakings toward minorities.[21]

Article 1 of the declaration stipulated that no law, regulation, or
official action could interfere with the rights outlined for the
minorities. Although Arabic became the official language of Iraq, Kurdish
became a corollary official language in Sulaimaniya, and both Kurdish and
Turkish became official languages in Kirkuk and Kifri. It stipulated that
Iraqi officials assigned to Kirkuk should not only speak Arabic but also
have competency in Kurdish and/or Turkish. The same article stipulated
that Iraqi courts should accept testimony in Kurdish and Turkish. Article
10 placed these rights under the League of Nations' guarantee. When the
league dissolved in 1946, the U.N. assumed responsibility for its
guarantees.[22] These U.N. obligations remain in effect.

Kirkuk in the Post-Independence Period

Soon after Iraqi independence, and especially with the growth of the oil
industry, the demography of Kirkuk began to shift. The late historian
Hanna Batatu explains: "Kirkuk had been Turkish through and through in
the not too distant past … [but] by degrees, Kurds moved into the city
from the surrounding villages … By 1959, they had swollen to more than
one-third of the population, and the Turkomans had declined to just over
half." While the Kurds "Kurdified" Irbil, Kirkuk retained a greater sense
of "cultural links with Turkey… [and] ethnic identity."[23]

This influx of Kurds into heavily Turkoman-populated areas upset the
fragile demographic balance and laid the groundwork for decades of ethnic
tension. On July 14-16, 1959, at the instigation of the Iraqi Communist
Party, a disproportionately Kurdish mob supported by a Kurdish military
unit rampaged through the city, targeting and killing prosperous
Turkomans and Turkoman leaders. President Abdul Karim Qasim estimated the
total death toll in the area at 120, with many executed and dumped in mass
graves. The pogrom ended only with Baghdad's military intervention.[24]
Still, the Turkoman identity remained intact. Reader Bullard, military
governor of Baghdad in 1920, wrote in 1961 that "the largest of the
Turkish towns in Iraq is Kirkuk."[25]

With the 1968 establishment of Baath Party control, the situation of the
city's Turkomans grew more precarious as Kirkuk became a flash point in
the struggle between the Iraqi central government and Kurdish rebel
leaders. Disputes about whether Kirkuk should be included in an
autonomous Kurdish-run zone led to the collapse of a proposed 1970
autonomy agreement between Iraqi Kurds and the central Iraqi government
with whom they had been fighting. In 1974, the Baathist government
gerrymandered provincial boundaries so as to dilute the Turkoman and
Kurdish population of the Kirkuk governorate and divided Turkoman
concentrations between different Arab-led provinces, and in 1975, the
Iraqi army moved in to crush the Kurds.

The Baathist regime launched a new round of ethnic cleansing and
oppression of minorities in the late 1980s and 1990s. A November 8, 1996
U.N. report detailed problems confronting the Turkomans. They faced
arbitrary arrest, internal deportation or exile, and confiscation of
personal property. Baghdad sought to change the demography of the city
and its environs to scatter Kurds and Turkomans and replace them with
Arabs. In addition, the central government forbade Kirkuk's Turkomans to
purchase and sell real estate, unless to Arabs.[26] A subsequent U.N.
report added detail to the ethnic cleansing campaign: it described
"nationality correction" forms in which the Baathist regime compelled
Turkomans to register themselves as Arabs prior to the 1997 census and
the expropriation of Turkoman agricultural land.[27] A 1998 report filed
by U.N. special rapporteur Max van der Stoel reinforced the severity of
Baghdad's campaign against the Turkomans and Kurds in Kirkuk.[28]

Kirkuk: Whose Jerusalem?

Kurds have long claimed Kirkuk as their own. In a May 2001 interview with
the Middle East Quarterly, Jalal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union
of Kurdistan who would later become Iraq's first postwar president,
called Kirkuk "the Jerusalem of Kurdistan."[29] Masoud Barzani, president
of the rival Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), has also claimed Kirkuk as
an exclusively Kurdish city[30] and insisted that Kirkuk rather than
Irbil should be capital of the Kurdistan Regional Government.[31] Both
Talabani and Barzani consider the Kirkuk oil fields to be theirs[32]
although Iraqi law defines the fields as part of the Iraqi national
patrimony.[33]

On the eve of war, many outside observers recognized the Turkoman nature
of Kirkuk's population. "Kirkuk is mainly Turkoman," observed
correspondent Julian Borger in The Guardian.[34] In the months preceding
Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Turkish government raised concern about the
potential for Kurdish militias to expand their area of control
unilaterally.[35] The U.S. government guaranteed that Kurds would not
enter Kirkuk or Mosul.[36] Soon after the start of hostilities, however,
20,000 Kurds flooded into these cities; half stayed.[37] In the days
following Saddam's fall, Kurdish militiamen sacked the Turkoman towns of
Altın Köprü, Kirkuk, Daquq, Tuzkhurmatu, and Mandali. U.S. forces
did little to prevent the pogroms and looting.[38] The peshmerga
plundered abandoned government offices in Kirkuk. They burned land deeds
and birth registries so as to remove evidence countering their claim that
Kirkuk is a Kurdish city.[39]

With U.S. red lines shown to be ephemeral, the Kurds continued their
migration. In August 2004, journalists reported that as many as 500 Kurds
a day streamed into Kirkuk, a move calculated to skew a pre-election
census. U.S. military authorities estimated that 72,000 Kurds settled in
Kirkuk between April 2003 and August 2004.[40] The Kurdish political
parties encouraged the flight with subsidies[41] and, in some cases,
denial of livelihood for those who refused to move from Sulaimaniya,
Irbil, and other majority Kurdish cities to Kirkuk.[42]

U.S. authorities undercut the Turkoman response. Shortly after Iraq's
liberation, Washington and London established the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) to act as an interim administration of Iraq. L. Paul
Bremer, its administrator, established a 25-member governing council to
advise his rule. U.S. and British officials sought to make the council
representative of Iraqi society. It filled these seats using often
arbitrary calculations of Iraq's population. Because Bremer believed the
Turkoman population to be less than 5 percent, the CPA allocated only one
Turkoman representative. And, because of some U.S. diplomats' desires to
fulfill gender quotas, they appointed Songul Chopuk, a young woman with
no constituency, to represent this group.[43] The CPA excluded the Iraqi
Turkoman Front, the most prominent Iraqi Turkoman organization. Iraqi
Turkomans protested that this initial slight denied them proper input on
their community's issues.[44] The Turkomans complained that !
their representative on the council did not adequately reflect their
political views. Among those issues that most concern the Turkomans are
recognition of Turkish as one of the official languages of Iraq, their
acknowledgment as a component community within the country, and, most
importantly, the status of Kirkuk. Washington's subsequent decision to
appoint only one Turkoman minister—and only to the relatively minor
portfolio of science and technology—in a 33-member cabinet compounded the
problem.

Tensions rose as Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomans vied for control of the city.
There have been riots[45] and assassinations.[46] The Kurdish political
parties sought to monopolize government offices and, by extension,
government services in the city. Turkoman officials say that Kurdish
bureaucrats mandate exclusive use of Kurdish in government offices, even
though the majority of the city's population does not speak the language.
The Kurdistan Democratic Party's minister of peshmerga affairs declared,
"We are ready to fight against all forces to control Kirkuk. Our share is
very little. We will try to take a larger share."[47] Just as Saddam used
his power to dispense patronage to a single ethnic and political group,
so, too, do followers of Talabani and Barzani today. With fewer resources
at their disposal, Iraqi Turkoman political parties have been unable to
organize their constituency to the same extent.

It is incumbent upon both the international community and the new Iraqi
government to protect the rights of the Turkomans now threatened by both
Kurdish expansionism and the intolerance by some factions of the central
government.

Conclusions

The Kirkuk issue will not go away. Kurds may feel they have a real claim
to Kirkuk, or they may be guided more by a desire to attain its oil
wealth. Ethnic cleansing cannot be justified, whether ordered by Saddam
Hussein or Masoud Barzani. Nor will Iraq's Turkoman community renounce
their historical claim and legal rights. "Kirkuk is to Iraq what Kosovo
is to the Balkans,"[48] a U.S. military official has said.

So what can be done? There will not be peace or stability in Kirkuk if the
rights or identity of any of the city's communities are trampled. Local
Kurdish authorities have sought to impose their will through force. They
have shown themselves unwilling to move beyond communal interests to
represent all citizens of Kirkuk. As the Kurdish parties exploit and
exacerbate ethnic tensions, the risk of instability in Kirkuk grows. The
international community might respond by sending human rights monitors in
Kirkuk until the local population can elect a representative government in
the city and region. This will require a fair and impartial census under
the monitoring and supervision of the United Nations.

The U.S. government and other coalition partners should also pressure the
Iraqi central government in Baghdad to maintain the unity of state,
constrain local militias, and prevent local ethnic or sectarian
cleansing. For Iraq to remain viable, the Iraqi law and constitutional
interpretations should address the core concerns of Iraq's diverse
communities. To do otherwise, and allow Kirkuk to fester, will undercut
Iraq's stability, provoke ethnic strife, and perhaps even lead to civil
war.

Yücel Güçlü is a first counselor at Turkish Embassy in Washington, D.C.
These views are his own and do not necessarily represent the views of the
Turkish government.

[1] Perhaps the best Western-language treatment of the Turkomans is Scott
Taylor, Among the "Others": Encounters with the Forgotten Turkmen of Iraq
(Ottawa: Esprit De Corps Books, 2004).
[2] Eric Davis, Memories of State (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2005).
[3] Erşat Hürmüzlü, Türkmenler ve Irak (Istanbul: Kerkük Vakfı,
2003), pp. 81-4.
[4] Ibid., p. 81.
[5] Middle East Economic Survey, Apr. 4, 2005.
[6] Suphi Saatçi, Tarihten Günümüze Irak Türkmenleri (Istanbul: Ötüken
Neşriyat, 2003), pp. 15-79.
[7] For the political history of northern Iraq, see Sinan Marufoğlu,
Osmanlı Döneminde Kuzey Irak (Istanbul: Eren
Yayıncılık, 1998), pp. 31-40; for Kirkuk's civic and
administrative lives at the turn of the twentieth century, see Ebubekir
Hazım Tepeyran, Hatıralar, 2nd ed. (Istanbul: Pera Turizm ve
Ticaret, 1998), pp. 505-12. Ebubekir Hazım Tepeyran, a professional
administrator, served as governor of the Mosul vilayet, 1899-1902.
[8] "Memorandum Concerning the New Organisation of the Ottoman Empire, 23
June 1919," in E.L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, eds., Documents on British
Foreign Policy, 1919-1939 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1960),
pp. 647-51. For the full text of the Fourteen Points see Papers Relating
to the Foreign Affairs of the United States. The Paris Peace Conference,
1919, vol. 4 (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office,
1943), pp. 12-7.
[9] Tepeyran, Hatıralar, pp. 358-62, 521-7.
[10] "Notes by Vice-Consul Wilkie Young on the Mosul district," paragraphs
16 and 80; "Sir Gerald Lowther (Istanbul) to Sir Edward Grey (London) with
enclosures and annexes, Apr. 5, 1910, notes on Mosul district," enclosure
2 in no. 1, FO 371/1008.
[11] W.R. Hay, Two Years in Kurdistan: Experiences of a Political Officer,
1918-1920 (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1921), pp. 81, 85-6.
[12] "Command Papers 1814," Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs,
1922-1923. Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace (London: His
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1923), p. 342.
[13] Liora Lukitz, Iraq: The Search for National Identity (London: Frank
Cass, 1995), p. 40.
[14] Arnold Wilson, Mesopotamia 1917-1920: A Clash of Loyalties (London:
Oxford University Press, 1931), pp. 259-60.
[15] Extract from report prepared by Gertrude Bell under direction of
civil commissioner, "Baghdad, Mesopotamia: Review of Civil
Administration, 1914-1918," FO 371/5081, 1920.
[16] Lukitz, Iraq, p. 41.
[17] Cecil John Edmonds, Kurds, Turks and Arabs: Politics, Travel and
Research in North-Eastern Iraq, 1919-1925 (London: Oxford University
Press, 1957), pp. 266, 283, 342-3; Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, Iraq, 1900
to 1950: A Political, Social, and Economic History (London: Oxford
University Press, 1956), p. 127.
[18] Lukitz, Iraq, pp. 41-2.
[19] Report submitted to the council by the commission instituted by the
Council Resolution of Sept. 30, 1924, document C. 400, M-147, 1925, VII,
League of Nations, pp. 38, 46-7.
[20] Cecil John Edmonds, "The Kurds of Iraq," Middle East Journal, Winter
1957, p. 59; idem, "The Kurds and Revolution in Iraq," Middle East
Journal, Winter 1959, p. 10.
[21] "Declaration of the Kingdom of Iraq, Made at Baghdad on 30 May 1932,
on the Occasion of the Termination of the Mandatory Regime in Iraq, and
Containing the Guarantees Given to the Council by the Iraqi Government,"
League of Nations Official Journal (Geneva: League of Nations, July
1932), Annex 1373, pp. 1347-50.
[22] For the assumption of the United Nations of the functions and powers
belonging to the League of Nations under the international agreements,
see League of Nations Official Journal, "Records of the Twentieth
(Conclusion) and Twenty-first Ordinary Sessions of the Assembly, Texts of
the Debates at the Plenary Meetings and Minutes of the First and Second
Committees, Special Supplement No. 194," 1946, pp. 221-4. For the
transfer to the United Nations of certain functions and activities of the
League of Nations, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1946-1947 (Lake
Success, N.Y.: Department of Public Information, 1947), pp. 110-3.
[23] "Statistical Compilation Relating to the Population Census of 1957
(in Arabic), I, Part IV, 170," Iraq, Ministry of the Interior, in Hanna
Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 913; David McDowall, A
Modern History of the Kurds (London: I.B.Tauris, 1996), p. 3.
[24] George Kirk, Contemporary Arab Politics (New York: Frederick Praeger,
1961), pp. 162-3; Amb. John Jernegan's dispatches in Foreign Relations of
the United States, Diplomatic Papers (1958-1960), vol. 12 (Washington
D.C.: U.S. State Department, 1993), pp. 473-95; Majid Khadduri,
Republican Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics since the Revolution of 1958
(London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 124.
[25] Reader Bullard, The Camels Must Go (London: Faber and Faber, 1961),
p. 100.
[26] "Situation of Human Rights in Iraq: Note by the Secretary-General,"
U.N. General Assembly, Fifty-first session agenda item 110 (c),
A/51/496/Add.1, Nov. 8, 1996, p. 4.
[27] Ibid., agenda item 110 (c), A/52/476/Add.1, Oct. 15, 1997, p. 2.
[28] "Report on the Violations of Human Rights in Iraq Submitted by the
Special Rapporteur Max van der Stoel in Accordance with Commission
Resolution 1997/60," U.N. General Assembly, Commission on Human Rights,
Fifty-first session agenda item (10), E/CN.4/1987/67, Mar. 10, 1998, p.
2.
[29] Jalal Talabani, "No Grounds for Relations with Baghdad" Middle East
Quarterly, Winter 2002, pp. 19-23.
[30] Turkish Daily News (Ankara), July 17, 2002.
[31] International Herald Tribune, June 21, 2004.
[32] Middle East Economic Survey, June 14, 2004.
[33] Article 108, Iraqi Constitution, in The Washington Post, Oct. 12,
2005.
[34] The Guardian (London), Oct. 12, 2002.
[35] Michael Rubin, "A Comedy of Errors: American-Turkish Diplomacy and
the Iraq War," Turkish Policy Quarterly, Spring 2005.
[36] See "Final Statement of the Meeting of Representatives of Turkey and
the United States with the Delegations of Assyrian Democratic Movement,
Constitutional Monarchy Movement, Iraqi National Accord, Iraqi National
Congress, Iraqi Turkoman Front, Kurdistan Democratic Party, Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan, and Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq,"
Ankara, Mar. 19, 2003.
[37] The New York Times, Apr. 20, 2003.
[38] Reuters, Mar. 2, 2004.
[39] The Washington Post, Apr. 11, 2003; Los Angeles Times, Apr. 11, 2003;
Hürriyet (Istanbul), Apr. 11, 2003; Radikal (Istanbul), Apr. 11, 2003.
[40] Associated Press, Sept. 16, 2004.
[41] Associated Press, Sept. 16, 2004.
[42] U.N. Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), Sept. 23, 2004.
[43] Rubin, "A Comedy of Errors."
[44] Anatolia News Agency, July 16, 2003.
[45] The Washington Post, Aug. 24, 2003.
[46] Associated Press, Jan. 26, 2006.
[47] International Herald Tribune, Jan. 3, 2005.
[48] Associated Press, Sept. 16, 2004.

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