Who Owns Kirkuk? The Turkoman Case
by Yücel Güçlü
Middle East Quarterly
Winter 2007
http://www.meforum.org/article/1074
The question of Kirkuk's final status remains among the touchiest issues
concerning Iraq's future. The Iraqi Kurdish political parties seek to
include Kirkuk in a federal Kurdish state, an outcome at odds with Iraqi
Turkoman sensitivities. The Turkomans consider Kirkuk to be their own
ancestral capital and cultural center. Understanding the Turkoman claim
to Kirkuk is essential to defuse a potentially explosive problem.
Policymakers and commentators outside Turkey often ignore the Turkomans.
Literature about them is scarce in Western languages; the little that
exists is limited in academic rigor and utility.[1] Furthermore, in terms
of enunciating their concerns and interacting with Western officials, the
Turkomans themselves have not always been effective spokesmen for their
cause.
For centuries, the Turkomans have been part of the urban elite in cities
such as Baghdad, Mosul, and Kirkuk. They remain an integral part of Iraq
although their population is debated. It is hard to come by adequate
population numbers in Iraq. After the 1958 revolution and the Baath Party
coup ten years later, successive Iraqi governments embraced Arab
nationalism[2] and worked to subvert the rights of the Kurdish and
Turkoman communities. The last reliable census in Iraq—and the only one
in which participants could declare their mother tongue—was in 1957. It
found that Turkomans were the third largest ethnicity in Iraq, after
Arabs and Kurds. The Turkomans numbered 567,000 out of a total population
of 6,300,000. Later polls dropped "Turkoman" as a category. Basing his
estimate on the 1957 census data and a growth rate of 2.5 percent
annually, Erşat Hürmüzlü, a Kirkuk-born Turkoman scholar, estimated
Iraq's Turkoman population today at no less than two million Turkomans,!
out of a total population of 25 million.[3]
The City of Kirkuk
The status of Kirkuk remains one of Iraq's major flash points. A city of
more than 750,000[4] in the center of northern Iraq, it sits adjacent to
oil fields holding 40 percent of Iraq's reserves[5] and is surrounded by
some of Iraq's richest agricultural land. Kirkuk's history is complex,
replete with competing claims to suzerainty.
Kirkuk's history dates back thousands of years.[6] The Ottoman Empire
incorporated Kirkuk—and much of what is now Iraq—into its domains in
1534. Kirkuk grew in importance in the eighteenth century when it became
the capital of the Ottoman sanjak (county or sub-district) of
Şehrizor, comprising the areas of Kirkuk, Arbil, and Sulaimaniya.
With the reforms of Midhat Pasha, Baghdad's governor between 1869 and
1872, the name Şehrizor was given to the sanjak of Kirkuk
(corresponding to the present areas of Kirkuk and Arbil). In 1879, the
Ottoman government in Istanbul created the Mosul vilayet, which
incorporated most of what is now northern Iraq. Kirkuk remained an
important garrison town and, for reasons of language and the composition
of the population, a valuable Ottoman recruiting center for civil
servants and gendarmes. Ottoman culture thrived in the city.[7] The
Turkomans dominated the merchant class and provided economic stability to
the city.
Following its defeat in World War I, the Ottoman Empire forfeited much of
its territory in the Middle East. But, because the majority of the area
of Kirkuk was Turkish, the Ottoman government refused to renounce its
claim. The Sublime Porte based its claim on President Woodrow Wilson's
Fourteen Points, Article XII of which stipulated that the Turkish
portions of the Ottoman Empire should be assured sovereignty. The Ottoman
delegation to the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 argued that in "Asia the
Turkish lands are bounded on the south by the provinces of Mosul and
Diyarbekir, as well as a part of Aleppo as far as the Mediterranean."[8]
At this time, Kirkuk's leading families were Turkoman: the Neftçiler—whose
name in Turkish means oil producer—had owned and exploited the oil
seepages since a 1693 imperial decree; the Yakuboğulları were
landowners; and the Kırdars were both landowners and merchants. In
addition, the city was home to scores of soldiers and civil servants who
had reached high office in the Ottoman service but retired to their home
province after the Allies dismembered the empire. The Turkomans retained
the position of social influence they had enjoyed under Ottoman rule.[9]
Indeed, Turkish remained the language of communication not only within
the sanjak but also in Baghdad. The only local newspaper was the Turkish
Necme, and there was an association of Turkoman writers. A.F. Miller, the
resident British assistant administrative inspector, could only speak
Turkish; he had little need for Arabic or Kurdish. And the British vice
consul in Mosul, H.E. Wilkie Young, wrote, "There a!
re 7,000 houses in the town of Kirkuk, and the population is not less
than 40,000, of whom about 2,500 are Jews and only 630 Christians. The
rest are Moslems of Turkoman origin. The language of the place is
consequently Turkish."[10] W.R. Hay, another British political officer in
northern Iraq, likewise described a Turkoman crescent stretching from
Mosul through Kirkuk and southward to Mandali. He described how "Kirkuk
is the main centre of this Turkish population … Several villages in its
vicinity are also Turkish-speaking, whereas the other towns are isolated
communities surrounded by Kurds and Arabs. Large numbers of the
middle-class Turks of Kirkuk and Arbil who possess some land, but wish to
augment their incomes, learn to read and write, wear European clothes and
undertake appointments in the government service. Kirkuk and Arbil,
especially the former, provided large numbers of officials to the Ottoman
government."[11] That the British government drew up its proclamat!
ions to the city's residents in the same Turkish language used!
at the
time in Istanbul[12] was a testament to Kirkuk's Turkish character.
Britain, as the occupying power, sought to legitimize its imposition of
the Hashemite monarchy on the country through popular vote. During the
July 1921 referendum, the people of Kirkuk rejected both inclusion in the
new kingdom of Iraq and Faisal, the British choice for king. Kirkuk
officials did not take part in the August 23, 1921 proclamation ceremony
for Faisal. Rather than turn toward Baghdad, Kirkuk's population
continued to identify with Turkey.[13] Sir Arnold Wilson, the first
British high commissioner of Iraq (1917-20) observed, "Kirkuk had always
been a stronghold of Turkish officialdom, and pro-Turkish views here were
a disturbing element for the occupation forces."[14] Gertrude Bell, who
would serve as Oriental secretary to the British civil administrator and
later to the high commissioner of Iraq, acknowledged Kirkuk's Turkish
character: "The inhabitants of Kirkuk are largely of Turkish blood,
descendants of Turkish settlers dating from the time of Seljuks." [1!
5]
In order to persuade Kirkuk's notables to participate in elections for
Iraq's new Constituent Assembly, the British high commissioner appointed
a Turkoman sub-governor (mutasarrıf) and other Turkoman officials to
top administrative posts in Kirkuk. London wanted Kirkuk to accede to 1923
elections organized by the British to bestow legitimacy upon the new
rulers in Baghdad. The Kirkuk residents made their participation in the
electoral process conditional on four provisions: (1) non-interference of
the government in local electoral procedures; (2) the preservation of the
district administration's Turkish character; (3) recognition of Turkish
as the district's official language; and (4) the appointment of Kirkukis
in all subsequent Baghdad cabinets.[16] When Sayyid Abd al-Rahman
al-Gaylani formed his first Iraqi cabinet on October 25, 1920, his
minister of education and health was İzzet Pasha, a retired Turkoman
general from Kirkuk.[17]
In July 1923, Prime Minister 'Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa'dun sent a telegram in
Turkish to the sub-governor confirming that the Council of Ministers in
Baghdad had accepted conditions two and three. While this did not go far
enough for Kirkuk's local notables, it nevertheless constituted Baghdad's
de facto recognition of their authority.[18]
On September 30, 1924, the League of Nations set up a commission to decide
on the future of the Mosul vilayet. The commission spent some two months
in the disputed area visiting the principal localities, speaking to local
notables and other residents. It did not equate language with loyalty and,
indeed, found that many Arabic speakers considered themselves loyal more
to Turkey than Iraq. Nor did the commission find any merit to British
claims that there was a distinction between Turks and Turkomans.[19] It
was not until Turkish, British, and Iraqi representatives in Ankara
signed a tripartite treaty on June 5, 1926, that the three countries
finalized the status of the Mosul vilayet, assigning the region—including
Kirkuk—to Iraq.
Prior to granting Iraq independence, the British-supervised Iraqi
government sought to compel the Arab majority to respect minority rights.
The Iraqi parliament enacted Local Languages Law No. 74, 1931, to make
Kurdish and Turkish official languages in various northern districts
including Kirkuk. The law also stipulated that the language of
instruction should be that of the majority of pupils. The law
acknowledged both Kirkuk and Kifri to be majority Turkoman.[20]
As condition of acceptance into the League of Nations, the Iraqi
government on May 30, 1932, specified areas where minority languages,
local administration, law courts, and primary education were to function.
This declaration was incorporated into the constitution of 1925 with the
reaffirmation of Iraq's undertakings toward minorities.[21]
Article 1 of the declaration stipulated that no law, regulation, or
official action could interfere with the rights outlined for the
minorities. Although Arabic became the official language of Iraq, Kurdish
became a corollary official language in Sulaimaniya, and both Kurdish and
Turkish became official languages in Kirkuk and Kifri. It stipulated that
Iraqi officials assigned to Kirkuk should not only speak Arabic but also
have competency in Kurdish and/or Turkish. The same article stipulated
that Iraqi courts should accept testimony in Kurdish and Turkish. Article
10 placed these rights under the League of Nations' guarantee. When the
league dissolved in 1946, the U.N. assumed responsibility for its
guarantees.[22] These U.N. obligations remain in effect.
Kirkuk in the Post-Independence Period
Soon after Iraqi independence, and especially with the growth of the oil
industry, the demography of Kirkuk began to shift. The late historian
Hanna Batatu explains: "Kirkuk had been Turkish through and through in
the not too distant past … [but] by degrees, Kurds moved into the city
from the surrounding villages … By 1959, they had swollen to more than
one-third of the population, and the Turkomans had declined to just over
half." While the Kurds "Kurdified" Irbil, Kirkuk retained a greater sense
of "cultural links with Turkey… [and] ethnic identity."[23]
This influx of Kurds into heavily Turkoman-populated areas upset the
fragile demographic balance and laid the groundwork for decades of ethnic
tension. On July 14-16, 1959, at the instigation of the Iraqi Communist
Party, a disproportionately Kurdish mob supported by a Kurdish military
unit rampaged through the city, targeting and killing prosperous
Turkomans and Turkoman leaders. President Abdul Karim Qasim estimated the
total death toll in the area at 120, with many executed and dumped in mass
graves. The pogrom ended only with Baghdad's military intervention.[24]
Still, the Turkoman identity remained intact. Reader Bullard, military
governor of Baghdad in 1920, wrote in 1961 that "the largest of the
Turkish towns in Iraq is Kirkuk."[25]
With the 1968 establishment of Baath Party control, the situation of the
city's Turkomans grew more precarious as Kirkuk became a flash point in
the struggle between the Iraqi central government and Kurdish rebel
leaders. Disputes about whether Kirkuk should be included in an
autonomous Kurdish-run zone led to the collapse of a proposed 1970
autonomy agreement between Iraqi Kurds and the central Iraqi government
with whom they had been fighting. In 1974, the Baathist government
gerrymandered provincial boundaries so as to dilute the Turkoman and
Kurdish population of the Kirkuk governorate and divided Turkoman
concentrations between different Arab-led provinces, and in 1975, the
Iraqi army moved in to crush the Kurds.
The Baathist regime launched a new round of ethnic cleansing and
oppression of minorities in the late 1980s and 1990s. A November 8, 1996
U.N. report detailed problems confronting the Turkomans. They faced
arbitrary arrest, internal deportation or exile, and confiscation of
personal property. Baghdad sought to change the demography of the city
and its environs to scatter Kurds and Turkomans and replace them with
Arabs. In addition, the central government forbade Kirkuk's Turkomans to
purchase and sell real estate, unless to Arabs.[26] A subsequent U.N.
report added detail to the ethnic cleansing campaign: it described
"nationality correction" forms in which the Baathist regime compelled
Turkomans to register themselves as Arabs prior to the 1997 census and
the expropriation of Turkoman agricultural land.[27] A 1998 report filed
by U.N. special rapporteur Max van der Stoel reinforced the severity of
Baghdad's campaign against the Turkomans and Kurds in Kirkuk.[28]
Kirkuk: Whose Jerusalem?
Kurds have long claimed Kirkuk as their own. In a May 2001 interview with
the Middle East Quarterly, Jalal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union
of Kurdistan who would later become Iraq's first postwar president,
called Kirkuk "the Jerusalem of Kurdistan."[29] Masoud Barzani, president
of the rival Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), has also claimed Kirkuk as
an exclusively Kurdish city[30] and insisted that Kirkuk rather than
Irbil should be capital of the Kurdistan Regional Government.[31] Both
Talabani and Barzani consider the Kirkuk oil fields to be theirs[32]
although Iraqi law defines the fields as part of the Iraqi national
patrimony.[33]
On the eve of war, many outside observers recognized the Turkoman nature
of Kirkuk's population. "Kirkuk is mainly Turkoman," observed
correspondent Julian Borger in The Guardian.[34] In the months preceding
Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Turkish government raised concern about the
potential for Kurdish militias to expand their area of control
unilaterally.[35] The U.S. government guaranteed that Kurds would not
enter Kirkuk or Mosul.[36] Soon after the start of hostilities, however,
20,000 Kurds flooded into these cities; half stayed.[37] In the days
following Saddam's fall, Kurdish militiamen sacked the Turkoman towns of
Altın Köprü, Kirkuk, Daquq, Tuzkhurmatu, and Mandali. U.S. forces
did little to prevent the pogroms and looting.[38] The peshmerga
plundered abandoned government offices in Kirkuk. They burned land deeds
and birth registries so as to remove evidence countering their claim that
Kirkuk is a Kurdish city.[39]
With U.S. red lines shown to be ephemeral, the Kurds continued their
migration. In August 2004, journalists reported that as many as 500 Kurds
a day streamed into Kirkuk, a move calculated to skew a pre-election
census. U.S. military authorities estimated that 72,000 Kurds settled in
Kirkuk between April 2003 and August 2004.[40] The Kurdish political
parties encouraged the flight with subsidies[41] and, in some cases,
denial of livelihood for those who refused to move from Sulaimaniya,
Irbil, and other majority Kurdish cities to Kirkuk.[42]
U.S. authorities undercut the Turkoman response. Shortly after Iraq's
liberation, Washington and London established the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) to act as an interim administration of Iraq. L. Paul
Bremer, its administrator, established a 25-member governing council to
advise his rule. U.S. and British officials sought to make the council
representative of Iraqi society. It filled these seats using often
arbitrary calculations of Iraq's population. Because Bremer believed the
Turkoman population to be less than 5 percent, the CPA allocated only one
Turkoman representative. And, because of some U.S. diplomats' desires to
fulfill gender quotas, they appointed Songul Chopuk, a young woman with
no constituency, to represent this group.[43] The CPA excluded the Iraqi
Turkoman Front, the most prominent Iraqi Turkoman organization. Iraqi
Turkomans protested that this initial slight denied them proper input on
their community's issues.[44] The Turkomans complained that !
their representative on the council did not adequately reflect their
political views. Among those issues that most concern the Turkomans are
recognition of Turkish as one of the official languages of Iraq, their
acknowledgment as a component community within the country, and, most
importantly, the status of Kirkuk. Washington's subsequent decision to
appoint only one Turkoman minister—and only to the relatively minor
portfolio of science and technology—in a 33-member cabinet compounded the
problem.
Tensions rose as Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomans vied for control of the city.
There have been riots[45] and assassinations.[46] The Kurdish political
parties sought to monopolize government offices and, by extension,
government services in the city. Turkoman officials say that Kurdish
bureaucrats mandate exclusive use of Kurdish in government offices, even
though the majority of the city's population does not speak the language.
The Kurdistan Democratic Party's minister of peshmerga affairs declared,
"We are ready to fight against all forces to control Kirkuk. Our share is
very little. We will try to take a larger share."[47] Just as Saddam used
his power to dispense patronage to a single ethnic and political group,
so, too, do followers of Talabani and Barzani today. With fewer resources
at their disposal, Iraqi Turkoman political parties have been unable to
organize their constituency to the same extent.
It is incumbent upon both the international community and the new Iraqi
government to protect the rights of the Turkomans now threatened by both
Kurdish expansionism and the intolerance by some factions of the central
government.
Conclusions
The Kirkuk issue will not go away. Kurds may feel they have a real claim
to Kirkuk, or they may be guided more by a desire to attain its oil
wealth. Ethnic cleansing cannot be justified, whether ordered by Saddam
Hussein or Masoud Barzani. Nor will Iraq's Turkoman community renounce
their historical claim and legal rights. "Kirkuk is to Iraq what Kosovo
is to the Balkans,"[48] a U.S. military official has said.
So what can be done? There will not be peace or stability in Kirkuk if the
rights or identity of any of the city's communities are trampled. Local
Kurdish authorities have sought to impose their will through force. They
have shown themselves unwilling to move beyond communal interests to
represent all citizens of Kirkuk. As the Kurdish parties exploit and
exacerbate ethnic tensions, the risk of instability in Kirkuk grows. The
international community might respond by sending human rights monitors in
Kirkuk until the local population can elect a representative government in
the city and region. This will require a fair and impartial census under
the monitoring and supervision of the United Nations.
The U.S. government and other coalition partners should also pressure the
Iraqi central government in Baghdad to maintain the unity of state,
constrain local militias, and prevent local ethnic or sectarian
cleansing. For Iraq to remain viable, the Iraqi law and constitutional
interpretations should address the core concerns of Iraq's diverse
communities. To do otherwise, and allow Kirkuk to fester, will undercut
Iraq's stability, provoke ethnic strife, and perhaps even lead to civil
war.
Yücel Güçlü is a first counselor at Turkish Embassy in Washington, D.C.
These views are his own and do not necessarily represent the views of the
Turkish government.
[1] Perhaps the best Western-language treatment of the Turkomans is Scott
Taylor, Among the "Others": Encounters with the Forgotten Turkmen of Iraq
(Ottawa: Esprit De Corps Books, 2004).
[2] Eric Davis, Memories of State (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2005).
[3] Erşat Hürmüzlü, Türkmenler ve Irak (Istanbul: Kerkük Vakfı,
2003), pp. 81-4.
[4] Ibid., p. 81.
[5] Middle East Economic Survey, Apr. 4, 2005.
[6] Suphi Saatçi, Tarihten Günümüze Irak Türkmenleri (Istanbul: Ötüken
Neşriyat, 2003), pp. 15-79.
[7] For the political history of northern Iraq, see Sinan Marufoğlu,
Osmanlı Döneminde Kuzey Irak (Istanbul: Eren
Yayıncılık, 1998), pp. 31-40; for Kirkuk's civic and
administrative lives at the turn of the twentieth century, see Ebubekir
Hazım Tepeyran, Hatıralar, 2nd ed. (Istanbul: Pera Turizm ve
Ticaret, 1998), pp. 505-12. Ebubekir Hazım Tepeyran, a professional
administrator, served as governor of the Mosul vilayet, 1899-1902.
[8] "Memorandum Concerning the New Organisation of the Ottoman Empire, 23
June 1919," in E.L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, eds., Documents on British
Foreign Policy, 1919-1939 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1960),
pp. 647-51. For the full text of the Fourteen Points see Papers Relating
to the Foreign Affairs of the United States. The Paris Peace Conference,
1919, vol. 4 (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office,
1943), pp. 12-7.
[9] Tepeyran, Hatıralar, pp. 358-62, 521-7.
[10] "Notes by Vice-Consul Wilkie Young on the Mosul district," paragraphs
16 and 80; "Sir Gerald Lowther (Istanbul) to Sir Edward Grey (London) with
enclosures and annexes, Apr. 5, 1910, notes on Mosul district," enclosure
2 in no. 1, FO 371/1008.
[11] W.R. Hay, Two Years in Kurdistan: Experiences of a Political Officer,
1918-1920 (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1921), pp. 81, 85-6.
[12] "Command Papers 1814," Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs,
1922-1923. Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace (London: His
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1923), p. 342.
[13] Liora Lukitz, Iraq: The Search for National Identity (London: Frank
Cass, 1995), p. 40.
[14] Arnold Wilson, Mesopotamia 1917-1920: A Clash of Loyalties (London:
Oxford University Press, 1931), pp. 259-60.
[15] Extract from report prepared by Gertrude Bell under direction of
civil commissioner, "Baghdad, Mesopotamia: Review of Civil
Administration, 1914-1918," FO 371/5081, 1920.
[16] Lukitz, Iraq, p. 41.
[17] Cecil John Edmonds, Kurds, Turks and Arabs: Politics, Travel and
Research in North-Eastern Iraq, 1919-1925 (London: Oxford University
Press, 1957), pp. 266, 283, 342-3; Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, Iraq, 1900
to 1950: A Political, Social, and Economic History (London: Oxford
University Press, 1956), p. 127.
[18] Lukitz, Iraq, pp. 41-2.
[19] Report submitted to the council by the commission instituted by the
Council Resolution of Sept. 30, 1924, document C. 400, M-147, 1925, VII,
League of Nations, pp. 38, 46-7.
[20] Cecil John Edmonds, "The Kurds of Iraq," Middle East Journal, Winter
1957, p. 59; idem, "The Kurds and Revolution in Iraq," Middle East
Journal, Winter 1959, p. 10.
[21] "Declaration of the Kingdom of Iraq, Made at Baghdad on 30 May 1932,
on the Occasion of the Termination of the Mandatory Regime in Iraq, and
Containing the Guarantees Given to the Council by the Iraqi Government,"
League of Nations Official Journal (Geneva: League of Nations, July
1932), Annex 1373, pp. 1347-50.
[22] For the assumption of the United Nations of the functions and powers
belonging to the League of Nations under the international agreements,
see League of Nations Official Journal, "Records of the Twentieth
(Conclusion) and Twenty-first Ordinary Sessions of the Assembly, Texts of
the Debates at the Plenary Meetings and Minutes of the First and Second
Committees, Special Supplement No. 194," 1946, pp. 221-4. For the
transfer to the United Nations of certain functions and activities of the
League of Nations, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1946-1947 (Lake
Success, N.Y.: Department of Public Information, 1947), pp. 110-3.
[23] "Statistical Compilation Relating to the Population Census of 1957
(in Arabic), I, Part IV, 170," Iraq, Ministry of the Interior, in Hanna
Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 913; David McDowall, A
Modern History of the Kurds (London: I.B.Tauris, 1996), p. 3.
[24] George Kirk, Contemporary Arab Politics (New York: Frederick Praeger,
1961), pp. 162-3; Amb. John Jernegan's dispatches in Foreign Relations of
the United States, Diplomatic Papers (1958-1960), vol. 12 (Washington
D.C.: U.S. State Department, 1993), pp. 473-95; Majid Khadduri,
Republican Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics since the Revolution of 1958
(London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 124.
[25] Reader Bullard, The Camels Must Go (London: Faber and Faber, 1961),
p. 100.
[26] "Situation of Human Rights in Iraq: Note by the Secretary-General,"
U.N. General Assembly, Fifty-first session agenda item 110 (c),
A/51/496/Add.1, Nov. 8, 1996, p. 4.
[27] Ibid., agenda item 110 (c), A/52/476/Add.1, Oct. 15, 1997, p. 2.
[28] "Report on the Violations of Human Rights in Iraq Submitted by the
Special Rapporteur Max van der Stoel in Accordance with Commission
Resolution 1997/60," U.N. General Assembly, Commission on Human Rights,
Fifty-first session agenda item (10), E/CN.4/1987/67, Mar. 10, 1998, p.
2.
[29] Jalal Talabani, "No Grounds for Relations with Baghdad" Middle East
Quarterly, Winter 2002, pp. 19-23.
[30] Turkish Daily News (Ankara), July 17, 2002.
[31] International Herald Tribune, June 21, 2004.
[32] Middle East Economic Survey, June 14, 2004.
[33] Article 108, Iraqi Constitution, in The Washington Post, Oct. 12,
2005.
[34] The Guardian (London), Oct. 12, 2002.
[35] Michael Rubin, "A Comedy of Errors: American-Turkish Diplomacy and
the Iraq War," Turkish Policy Quarterly, Spring 2005.
[36] See "Final Statement of the Meeting of Representatives of Turkey and
the United States with the Delegations of Assyrian Democratic Movement,
Constitutional Monarchy Movement, Iraqi National Accord, Iraqi National
Congress, Iraqi Turkoman Front, Kurdistan Democratic Party, Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan, and Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq,"
Ankara, Mar. 19, 2003.
[37] The New York Times, Apr. 20, 2003.
[38] Reuters, Mar. 2, 2004.
[39] The Washington Post, Apr. 11, 2003; Los Angeles Times, Apr. 11, 2003;
Hürriyet (Istanbul), Apr. 11, 2003; Radikal (Istanbul), Apr. 11, 2003.
[40] Associated Press, Sept. 16, 2004.
[41] Associated Press, Sept. 16, 2004.
[42] U.N. Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), Sept. 23, 2004.
[43] Rubin, "A Comedy of Errors."
[44] Anatolia News Agency, July 16, 2003.
[45] The Washington Post, Aug. 24, 2003.
[46] Associated Press, Jan. 26, 2006.
[47] International Herald Tribune, Jan. 3, 2005.
[48] Associated Press, Sept. 16, 2004.
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