MERDEKA: November 2011

DEMOKRASI DAN PLURALITI: PERSPEKTIF AL-SIYASAT AL-SHAR`IYYAH

Siddiq Fadzil

Al-Siyasah al-Shar`iyyah
Ijtimak harakiy ini mengangkat tema  siyasah shar`iyyah  dengan semangat memugar dinamikanya sebagai disiplin penjana daya hidup pemikiran politik Islam, untuk memungkinkannya menghadapi pelbagai perkembangan dan perubahan yang terus-menerus menciptakan realiti-realiti baru.    Demikianlah hakikat siyasah shar`iyyah sebagaimana yang durumuskan oleh Fathiy `Uthman:

                                         (ijtihad dalam menangani hal-hal kenegaraan Islam
                                      yang sentiasa berkembang dan berubah)

Siyasah shar`iyyah dalam tradisi kesarjanaan Islam meliputi makna yang cukup luas.   Kaum fuqaha' mengertikannya sebagai wewenang para penguasa Muslimin membuat dasar-dasar dan aturan-aturan berasaskan maslahah selama tidak bertentangan dengan prinsip-prinsip agama meskipun tidak ada dalil khusus mengenainya.   Sementara itu para ulama yang bukan ahli   fiqh memakai istilahsiyasah shar`iyyah  dengan pengertian yang lebih luas iaitu pengurusan segala kepentingan umat (masalih al-`ibad) berasaskan ajaran syara`.   Untuk merumuskan kepelbagaian makna tersebut al-Shaykh `Abd al-Wahhab Khallaf menyarankan definisi yang inklusif bagi istilah al-siyasah al-shar`iyyah iaitu:

Ternyata siyasah shar`iyyah  adalah ijtihad merealisasikan maslahah penyejahteraan kehidupan umat, yang dalam konteks ini   maslahah yang dimaksudkan itu tidak lain adalah maqasid al-shari`ah.   Untuk itu memang politik Islam harus selamanya terikat dengan nas-nas syara`.   Justeru, objektif syara` adalah demi  maslahah umat. Namun demikian sebahagian maslahah tersebut direalisasikan menerusi ijtihad, terutama dalam hal-hal yang memang diserahkan kepada umat sendiri memutuskannya berasaskan pertimbangan apa yang terbaik dalam konteks zaman dan lingkungan yang berkembang dan berubah. Kerana itu al-siyasat al-shar`iyyah pada garis besarnya adalah al-`amal bi al-masalih al-mursalah.   Berasaskan bertimbangan al-masalih itulah umat harus menentukan sistem apa dan aturan bagaimana yang terbaik buat mereka.

Islam dan Demokrasi
Antara perkembangan di Dunia Islam yang sedang mendapat sorotan luas ketika ini ialah kebangkitan Islam sebagai kekuatan politik, dan keghairahan terhadap demokrasi.   Yang jelas, Islam dan demokrasi    telah menjadi isu yang dominan dalam wacana politik pasca Thawrat al-Shabab (Revolusi Pemuda) di Asia Barat. Ramalan bahawa rantau tersebut akan menjadi lebih Islamik dan sekaligus lebih demokratik telah menciptakan suatu scenario keserasian Islam dengan demokrasi, suatu yang mungkin tidak tergambar dalam pemikiran kaum sekularis yang selama ini mempersepsikan Islam sebagai promoter pemerintahan diktator-teokratik; malah mungkin juga tidak terbayang dalam benak golongan Muslim jumud yang melihat demokrasi sebagai suatu kekufuran.

Satu lagi perkembangan penting yang sedang menjadi tumpuan perhatian dunia ialah kemunculan Recep Tayyip Erdogan dan parti pimpinannya (AKP) di Turki.    Kejayaannya memenangi pilihan raya umum tiga kali berturut-turut dengan dukungan rakyat yang semakin meluas, di samping prestasi cemerlangnya dalam pelbagai bidang:   ekonomi, politik dan diplomatik telah memberikan pencitraan baru terhadap Islam dan demokrasi. Adalah suatu yang sangat bererti apabila Turki disebut sebagai a working example of Muslim democracy.   Segala perkembangan tersebut memberikan harapan bahawa Islam akan lebih menyemarak dalam sistem demokrasi yang sihat,   dan demikian pula demokrasi akan lebih subur dan segar di bawah pimpinan Muslim-demokrat, berbanding keadaannya ketika di bawah kekuasaan nasionalis-sekularis-autokrat.

Pada hakikatnya Islam dan demokrasi tidak semestinya bertentangan, dan tidak juga semestinya bersesuaian.   Sesuai atau tidaknya tergantung bagaimana kita mempersepsikan politik Islam dan bagaimana kita mendefinisikan demokrasi.    Mungkin bentuk-bentuk tertentu politik Islam memang bertentangan dengan model-model demokrasi tertentu. Tetapi mengingat hakikat bahawa politik Islam tidak membeku pada sesuatu bentuk, sementara demokrasi juga tidak membeku pada suatu model,     maka kemungkinan bertemunya Islam dengan demokrasi pada suatu titik keserasian adalah suatu yang sangat mungkin.

Kemungkinan seperti itulah yang cuba diteroka oleh para leluhur kita dalam gerakan Islam seperti Muhammad Natsir dan Abu al-A`la al-Mawdudiy.     Muhammad Natsir menerima demokrasi yang dimodifikasi menjadi  theistic democracy,   sementara al-Mawdudiy juga menerimanya dengan memodifikasikannya menjadi theo-democracy.    Demikianlah umumnya pendirian tokoh-tokoh gerakan Islam kontemporari yang melihat adanya maslahah dalam penerimaan terhadap demokrasi setelah ia diletakkan dalam perspektif dan worldview Islam.

Penerimaan terhadap demokrasi di kalangan ilmuwan dan tokoh gerakan Islam masa kini ternyata semakin meluas.    Bagaimanapun ini tidak bererti mereka telah menerima model demokrasi Barat sepenuh dan seutuhnya.   Dr. Yusuf al-Qaradawiy adalah antara tokoh paling artikulatif menyuarakan dukungannya terhadap demokrasi, tetapi tetap kritis terhadap model demokrasi Barat yang terlalu liberal dan telah terlepas dari kendali agama dan moral.    Yang menjadi asas pijakan pembelaan al-Qaradawiy terhahap demokrasi bukan bentuk jelmaannya di Barat, tetapi  jawhar al-dimuqratiyyah atau idea dasar demokrasi itu sendiri yang dinilainya selaras dengan Islam.

Al-Qaradawiy bertolak dari hakikat bahawa negara Islam bukan negara teokratik, bukan pemerintahan sekumpulan "orang agama" yang menguasai rakyat atas nama al-haqq al-Ilahiy.   Tetapi ia buka juga negara sekular yang memusuhi atau menolak agama.   Negara Islam adalah negara madani (civil) berasaskan Islam, berdasarkan bay`ah dan shura, yang ditadbir oleh pemerintah pilihan rakyat dari kalangan mereka yang berkelayakan:  qawiyyun amin dan hafizun `alim (perkasa dan dapat dipercaya, berintegriti moral dan berkompetensi intelektual).    Mereka bukan golongan maksum yang kebal kritik dan teguran.    Dalam pemerintahan Islam yang sedemikian, ruang partisipasi atau peranserta rakyat memang terbuka luas, terutama para ilmuwan yang secara agama diwajibkan menasihati pemerintah atas dasar amar makruf nahi munkar.

Dengan tegas al-Qaradawiy menyimpulkan bahawa pemerintahan Islam dibangun di atas prinsip-prinsip demokratik paling unggul,   tetapi dengan catatan bahawa ia bukan sebuah replika demokrasi Barat.    Demokratiknya Islam adalah kerana keserasiannya dengan    prinsip-prinsip dan nilai-nilai dasar demokrasi.   Apa yang disebut sebagai  jawhar al-dimuqratiyyah itu beliau rumuskan,    bahawa rakyatlah yang harus memilih sendiri pemerintah yang mereka senangi,   bahawa rakyat tidak boleh dipaksa menerima pemerintah yang mereka tidak suka, atau sistem yang mereka tidak suka;   bahawa rakyat berhak menilai (muhasabah) dan mengambil tindakan ke atas pemerintah apabila bersalah; bahawa rakyat berhak memecat atau menggantikan mereka apabila menyeleweng.   Demikianlah antara idea-idea teras faham demokrasi yang untuk merealisasikannya terciptalah sejumlah sistem dan mekanisme pelaksananya seperti pilihan raya, pungutan suara,   pengiktirafan keputusan suara terbanyak, pelaksanaan sistem pelbagai parti politik (ta`addud al-ahzab al-siyasiyyah), hak membangkang atau beroposisi (haqq al-mu`aradah) bagi golongan minoriti, kebebasan akhbar, kebebasan kehakiman dan seterusnya.   Al-Qaradawiy seterusnya bertanya,   jika itulah yang namanya demokrasi,   lalu di mana pertentangannya dengan Islam?

Demikianlah kenyataannya, pilihan raya sebagai mekanisme penting bagi terlaksananya demokrasi.       Tetapi ini tidak bererti bahawa asal ada pilihan raya, maka adalah demokrasi.   Pilihan raya asal-asalan tidak mungkin merealisasikan demokrasi yang sihat dan tulen. Justeru, demi terlaksananya demokrasi dalam erti semurninya,   pilihan raya harus adil dan bersih dari sebarang kecurangan.       Dan kerana itu pula perjuangan menuntut pilihan raya yang bersih adalah bahagian daripada perjuangan merealisasikan jawhar al-demuqratiyyah,   sistem yang disebut oleh al-Qaradawiy sebagai  min samim al-Islam.   Jika demikianlah hakikatnya, maka dari fiqh rimba mana datangnya fatwa bahawa perjuangan menuntut pilihan raya yang bersih itu bertentangan dengan Islam?

Seperti yang telah disebutkan, bahawa antara komponen penting jawhar al-dimuqratiyyah adalah haqq al-mu`aradah  atau hak untuk membangkang dan beroposisi.   Ia adalah penjelmaan hak kebebasan berfikir dan bersuara yang merupakan bahagian daripada hak asasi manusia.   Kerana itu kehadiran pembangkang harus diterima dengan jiwa besar sebagai unsur penting penyuburan dan penyegaran demokrasi. Dalam konteks Islam kritik dan bangkangan yang membina adalah bahagian daripada tanggungjawab al-amr bi al-ma`ruf wa al-nahy `an al-munkar.  Membangkang dalam semangat dan pengertian tersebut bukan sekadar suatu hak demokratik yang boleh dilaksanakan, dan boleh pula ditinggalkan (memang demikianlah yang namanya hak, yang boleh diambil dan boleh ditolak), tetapi lebih daripada itu ia adalah tanggungjawab keagamaan yang wajib dilaksanakan.   Jika demikianlah hakikatnya,   lalu dari fiqh hutan mana datangnya hukum bahawa pembangkang adalah golongan bughah (penderhaka)?

Demokrasi tidak hanya bererti pemerintahan golongan majoriti,   tetapi juga oposisi golongan minoriti, dan yang menjadi minoriti hari ini, mungkin berubah manjadi majoriti apabila sampai masanya nanti.    Demikian kata Dandal Jabr dalam tulisannya, al-Ta`addudiyyat al-Siyasiyyah wa Tadawul al-Sultah fi al-Siyasat al-Shar`iyyah

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Posted By Outreacher to Wadah Utara at 8/05/2011

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Dr Siddiq Fadil: DEMOKRASI DAN PLURALITI bahagian akhir

DEMOKRASI DAN PLURALITI:   PERSPEKTIF AL-SIYASAT AL-SHAR`IYYAH
Siddiq Fadzil

Islam dan Pluraliti

Dalam masyarakat demokratik tidak boleh ada pemaksaan menelan pendapat yang tidak disetujui.   Memaksa rakyat menerima pendapat penguasa dan   mencabul kebebasan media adalah sejenis al-irhab al-fikriy    atau terorisme pemikiran.    Pluraliti atau kepelbagaian, termasuk kepelbagaian pendapat seharusnya disikapi secara positif sebagai ikhtilaf yang membawa rahmah.    Sebagaimana halnya perbezaan pendapat dalam fiqh yang akhirnya membentuk pelbagai mazhab,   maka demikian jugalah perbezaan pendapat dalam politik yang kemudiannya menjelmakan pelbagai parti.   Kepelbagaian parti politik (ta`addud al-ahzab al-siyasiyyah) adalah suatu keperluan bagi mencegah kesewenang-wenangan para penguasa.   Dalam pemerintahan yang mengamalkan sistem satu parti,   tidak ada kekuatan korektif yang berkesan,   dan ini akan membuka ruang yang seluas-luasnya kepada segala bentuk penyelewengan, kecurangan dan kezaliman.   Dahulu, ketika Amir al-Mu'minin `Umar ibn al-Khattab r.`a. meminta rakyat membetulkannya jika beliau menyeleweng, ada yang bangkit dengan ikrar akan membetulkannya dengan pedang. Sukar untuk membayangkan hal seperti itu dapat dilakukan ketika ini, kerana semua pedang sudah di tangan penguasa, dan rakyat tidak punya apa-apa lagi.

Kehadiran pelbagai parti politik yang menawarkan agenda dan program yang berbeza-beza dapat memberikan peluang kepada rakyat memilih mana yang terbaik.   Dalam sistem demokrasi kekuatan idea harus disaingi dengan idea tandingan, bukan ditindas dengan kekerasan.     Semua parti akhirnya harus akur dengan keputusan rakyat yang dibuat melalui pilihan raya.   Mekanisme pilihan raya adalah jaminan proses peralihan kuasa dari parti ke parti secara damai, tanpa menyusahkan rakyat dalam silang sengketa pertumpahan darah.   Penggiliran kuasa memerintah di kalangan parti-parti politik seharusnya dianggap suatu yang wajar dan normal. Kerana itu parti yang berkuasa tidak perlu bertindak teror hancur-hancuran demi mempertahankan kuasanya, yang seolah-olah sudah menjadi harta pusaka datuk-nenek.

Bagi umat Islam pluraliti (tanawwu`, ta`addud, ikhtilaf) adalah fenomena ciptaan Tuhan yang sarat dengan hikmah. Yang mutlak Tunggal hanya Allah sendiri,   sedang makhluk diciptakan beragam (mukhtalifan) dan berpasangan (azwajan).   Manusia diciptakan lelaki dan perempuan,   berbangsa-bangsa dan bersuku-suku, berbeza-beza bahasa dan berlain-lainan warna.       Kepelbagaian tersebut diciptakan bukan tanpa makna. Pluraliti adalah tanda (ayat) yang menyiratkan hikmah dan makna untuk diteroka oleh al-`alimin, mereka yang memiliki daya renung keilmuan yang tajam.     Demikianlah premis yang membentuk sikap positif-apresiatif terhadap pluraliti.   Kerana itu pula tidak ada masalah bagi umat Islam menghadapi pluraliti masyarakat.

Dalam konteks Malaysia, rakyat bukan Muslim selayaknya dilayani sebagai saudara setanahair.     Mereka bukan lagi kaum dhimmiy, suatu pengkategorian yang sudah kehilangan justifikasi kesejarahannya.    Perubahan sejarah dan realiti politik telah menjadikan istilah tersebut tidak relevan lagi. Realiti inilah yang diserlahkan oleh Fahmiy Huwaydiy, lalu diungkapkan dengan tegas lewat judul bukunya Muwatinun la Dhimmiyyun (Warganegara, bukan Zimmiy).    Kesimpulan Huwaydiy tersebut mendapat dukungan penuh dari al-Qaradawiy yang menyarankan agar istilah tersebut dipadam sahaja kerana tidak lagi dapat diterima oleh kaum bukan Muslim:
        ŸàŸÑÿßÿ®ÿØ ŸÖŸÜ ÿ≠ÿ∞ŸÅ ŸÉŸÑŸÖÿßÿ™ ŸàŸÖÿµÿ∑ŸÑÿ≠ÿßÿ™ ÿ™ÿßÿ±ŸäÿÆŸäÿ© ŸÖŸÜ ŸÇÿßŸÖŸàÿ≥ ÿßŸÑÿ™ÿπÿßŸÖŸÑ ÿßŸÑŸÖÿπÿßÿµÿ±ÿå ŸÖÿ´ŸÑ ŸÉŸÑŸÖÿ© "ÿ∞ŸÖŸëÿ©" ÿßŸÑÿ™Ÿâ ŸÑŸÖ
         ŸäÿπÿØ ŸäŸÇÿ®ŸÑŸáÿß ÿ∫Ÿäÿ± ÿßŸÑŸÖÿ≥ŸÑŸÖŸäŸÜ.

Lebih jauh al-Qaradawiy menyebut warga bukan Muslim sebagai saudara ketika merujuk kaum Koptik dengan sebutan ikhwanuna al-Aqbat. Rupa-rupanya ada yang keberatan dengan sebutan saudara untuk orang bukan Muslim (Kristian). Dalam penjelasannya al-Qaradawiy menegaskan bahawa memang mereka adalah saudara kita setanahair:
         ÿ•ŸÜ ÿßŸÑÿ£ŸÇÿ®ÿßÿ∑ ÿ•ÿÆŸàÿßŸÜŸÜÿß ŸÅŸâ ÿßŸÑŸàÿ∑ŸÜÿå Ÿàÿ•ŸÜ ŸÑŸÖ ŸäŸÉŸàŸÜŸàÿß ÿ•ÿÆŸàÿßŸÜŸÜÿß ŸÅŸâ ÿßŸÑÿØŸäŸÜÿå Ÿäÿ¨ŸÖÿπŸÜÿß Ÿàÿ•ŸäÿßŸáŸÖ Ÿàÿ∑ŸÜ Ÿàÿßÿ≠ÿØ.

Dalam penghujahannya al-Qaradawiy merujuk sejumlah ayat dari surah al-Shu`ara' tentang hubungan persaudaraan (ukhuwwah) di antara para rasul (Nuh, Hud, Salih dan Lut `a.s.) dengan kaum masing-masing (Qawmu Nuh, kaum `Ad, kaum Thamud dan Qawmu Lut) yang semuanya kufur dan mendustakan para rasul itu.    Namun demikian al-Qur'an menyebut hubungan antara rasul-rasul tersebut dengan mereka sebagai hubungan persaudaraan:
                                             ŸÇÿßŸÑ ŸÑŸáŸÖ ÿ£ÿÆŸàŸáŸÖ

Dari ayat-ayat tersebut al-Qaradawiy merumuskan bahawa selain persaudaraan keagamaan (ukhuwwat al-din) masih ada lagi bentuk-bentuk persaudaraan yang lain: persaudaraan setanahair (al-ukhuwwat al-wataniyyah), persaudaraan sebangsa (al-ukhuwwat al-qawmiyyah), persaudaraan seikhtisas (al-ukhuwwat al-mihaniyyah), persaudaraan seinsaniah (al-ukhuwwat al-insaniyyah) dan seterusnya.

Sebagai saudara setanahair,    warga bukan Muslim dapat menjadi komponen pembentukan satu ummah bersama kaum Muslimin. Demikianlah petunjuk nabawi dalam pembentukan negara berbilang kaum sebagaimana yang didokumentasikan dalam Piagam Madani (Sahifah Madinah).    Kaum Muslimin adalah satu ummah, sementara Yahudi juga adalah satu ummah.   Tetapi dalam konteks kenegaraan, kedua-duanya dapat bergabung membentuk ummah Madaniyyah, tanpa melebur jati diri keumatan masing-masing.   Hakikat itulah yang diisyaratkan lewat ungkapan ummatun ma`a al-mu'minin (Yahudi bersama kaum Mukminin adalah satu ummah).   Kata kuncinya adalah ma`a (bersama).    Teks Piagam Madani tidak memakai ungkapan min al-Muslimin (Yahudi sebahagian daripada kaum Muslimin).

Berasaskan pertimbangan al-siyasat al-shar`iyyah, tidak ada halangan bagi kaum Muslimin mengadakan pakatan politik dengan parti-parti bukan Islam.   Asas pertimbangannya adalah maslahah.   Tidak ada nass yang menghalang sekiranya pakatan seumpama itu mengandungi masalahah bagi umat.     Atas pertimbangan yang sama, juga tidak ada halangan bagi kaum Muslimin berkongsi kuasa dengan warga bukan Muslim. Pada zaman kerajaan `Abbasiyyah,    ketika warga bukan Muslim masih dikategorikan sebagai kaum dhimmiy, al-Mawardiy (yang hidup pada zaman tersebut) dalam kitabnya al-Ahkam al-Siltaniyyah membolehkan   mereka   menjawat wazir al-tanfidh (menteri pelaksana).   Dalam konteks realiti kita hari ini tentunya ruang penyertaan warga bukan Muslim lebih luas lagi.

Keharmonian antara golongan yang beragam dan pelbagai diasaskan di atas suatu set nilai:   kemanusiaan,   persamaan, keadilan dan seterusnya.    Tidak ada golongan yang diunggulkan semata-mata kerana darah keturunan.     Keunggulan bukan hak eksklusif golongan tertentu, tetapi ditawarkan kepada semua yang sanggup memenuhi syarat.   Dalam Islam tidak ada ketuanan warisan, yang ada ialah keunggulan bersyarat (khayriyyatun mashrutah).   Keunggulan seperti itulah yang tersirat dalam ayat Ali `Imran:
                 ŸÉŸÜÿ™ŸÖ ÿÆŸäÿ±ÿ£ŸÖŸëÿ© ÿ£ÿÆÿ±ÿ¨ÿ™ ŸÑŸÑŸÜŸëÿßÿ≥ ÿ™ÿ£ŸÖÿ±ŸàŸÜ ÿ®ÿßŸÑŸÖÿπÿ±ŸàŸÅ Ÿàÿ™ŸÜŸáŸàŸÜ ÿπŸÜ ÿßŸÑŸÖŸÜŸÉÿ± Ÿàÿ™ÿ§ŸÖŸÜŸàŸÜ ÿ®ÿßŸÑŸÑŸá...

Keunggulan (khayriyyah) yang disebut dalam ayat tersebut   terkait dengan tiga syarat:
¬∑         Komitmen penegakan nilai-nilai kemakrufan.
¬∑         Kesanggupan berjuang melawan gejala kemunkaran.
¬∑         Beriman dengan Allah dalam erti yang seluas dan semurninya.

Ternyata tidak ada ketuanan yang dipusakai, kerana memang keunggulan tidak diwarisi. Keunggulan harus diraih dengan usaha gigih membina kekuatan watak berasaskan iman dan nilai-nilai murni.   Demikianlah, yang ada hanya keunggulan yang bersyaratkan usaha yang serius (khayriyyatun mashrutatun muktasabah).   Al-Qur'an tidak menyebut keunggulan yang berasaskan hak warisan perkauman (al-`unsuriyyat al-mawruthah).   Justeru, keunggugulan bukan monopoli sesuatu kaum.   Ia ditawarkan terbuka kepada semua yang sanggup memenuhi syarat,   termasuk golongan ahl al-kitab:
                                                 ŸàŸÑŸà ÿ¢ŸÖŸÜ ÿ£ŸáŸÑ ÿßŸÑŸÉÿ™ÿßÿ® ŸÑŸÉÿßŸÜ ÿÆŸäÿ±ÿß ŸÑŸáŸÖ ...

Mudah-mudahan Tuhan Yang Maha Rahman berkenan memberkati amal perjuangan tiga serangkai gerakan Islam PKPIM-ABIM-WADAH ini   meratakan rahmat sehingga seluruh warga alam dapat menikmati kurnia agung al-Islam sebagai rahmatan li al-`alamin.

Penghargaan dan Harapan

Sidang muktamirin, demikianlah yang terdaya kami ungkapkan dalam keadaan serba payah ketika ini. Maaf, atas ketidakmampuan hadir dan ikut serta sebagaimana mestinya. Hanya Tuhanlah Yang Maha Tahu betapa ingin untuk ikut hadir dalam ijtimak yang bersejarah ini. Tetapi sebagai pesakit saya tidak dapat mengingkari larangan doktor yang merawat saya (Prof. Dr. Hamidon Basri) yang pada penilaiannya kesan serangan penyakit Miller Fisher syndrome belum memungkinkan saya hadir.

Terima kasih atas do`a dan simpati sepanjang saya menjalani ujian ini. Sesungguhnya saya berasa sangat tertolong dengan barakah do`a dan munajat saudara-saudara. Mudah-mudahan derita yang menimpa ini menjadi kaffarah.    Kepada seluruh warga harakah saya mohon do`a yang berterusan semoga Allah berkenan mengurniakan kesembuhan penuh secepat-cepatnya untuk meneruskan kiprah amal bakti demi agama-Nya menerusi wadah tercinta ini.

                           ÿ±ÿ®ŸëŸÜÿßÿπŸÑŸäŸÉ ÿ™ŸàŸÉŸëŸÑŸÜÿß Ÿàÿ•ŸÑŸäŸÉ ÿ£ŸÜÿ®ŸÜÿß Ÿàÿ•ŸÑŸäŸÉ ÿßŸÑŸÖÿµŸäÿ±.   ÿßŸÑŸÑŸá ÿ£ŸÉÿ®ÿ± ŸàŸÑŸÑŸá ÿßŸÑÿ≠ŸÖÿØ.


Senarai Rujukan
Al-Qaradawiy, Yusuf. 2010.   Al-Watan wa al-Muwatanah. Kaherah: Dar al-Shuruq.

----------------------------   1997. Min Fiqh al-Dawlah fi al-Islam. Kaherah: Dar al-Shuruq.

Al-Sa`udiy, `Abd al-Wadud Mustafa. 2010. Al-Bayan al-Shafi fi al-Fiqh al-Islamiy: al-   Siyasat   al-Shar`iyyah.   Bangi: Fakulti Pengajian Islam, Universiti Kebangsaan  Malaysia.

Khallaf, `Abd al-Wahhab. 1984. Al-Siyasah al-Shar`iyyah. Beirut: Mu'assat al-Risalah.

`Uthman, Fathiy. 1979. Min Usul al-Fikr al-Siyasiy al-Islamiy. Beirut: Mu'assasat al- Risalah.

(Teks Amanat Pimpinan Wadah Ijtimak Harakiy ke-2 dan Seminar Siyasah Shar`iyyah: Demokrasi dan Pluraliti, 23 Julai 2011/21 Sha`ban 1432H.,  Taman EkspoPertanian Malaysia, Serdang .)

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Posted By Outreacher to Wadah Utara at 8/05/2011 06:07:00 PM

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Time for Change

If the problem and malaise affecting BN is merely that of public perception, then they are quite delusional and are caught up in their own self serving propaganda. BN as a government is in decline and is performing badly relative to the days in the past. They are losing economic competitiveness, their keen sense of development strategies which are losing lots of public money, revelations of rampant corruption and they have not been able to transform unlike whatever grand pronouncements made in that direction. They cannot even reconcile between national unity and Malay rights. Their media machines gun after each and everyone's racial phobia. Worse is that they have been caught time and again to be lying through their teeth. So this is beyond public relations and APCO like perception insights or piecemeal "make people fear or make people feel good" solutions. It needs a major revamp and that denial syndrome or that even if we are not performing "we are still the best for you" attitude and condescendence has to go.

Why is it supposed to a proposed reconciliation only between BN and PAS? Why be so dismissive of Anwar as if he is not significant politically whether in terms of national unity or Malay interests? If it is thought that Anwar has lost it and cannot garner public support across the races and throughout the country then let us remind ourselves of what the embattled Pak Lah, a former PM said back then. He said Anwar is someone forgotten before setting out to lead one of BN's most disastrous elections ever. It is a fact that Anwar has been in government administration and has so far been able to transcend across diverse political parties and backgrounds. It is still a fledgling political process but now we almost have a viable two party system for vibrant democratic check and balances.

The ones out to cripple Anwar are the same Malay-Muslims with an outrageous destructive agenda turning everything onto weapons to assail and destroy him. It has gone beyond mere character assassination. Some insane drive has them fanatically devoted to vanquish him. If God forbid, they somehow manage to be able to terminate him, it shall come together with demolishing and bringing down the whole nation's justice system. Does PAS really want to have anything to do with such wayward terminator like politicians?
We have to ponder this Sufi anecdote of the past. One day, Mulla Nasruddin a famous Sufi was seen kneeling on his lawn outside his house looking for something. His trusted pupil saw him and went to him kneeling beside him to help. The pupil asked, "What are you looking for, Mulla?". Mulla answered, "I'm looking for my keys." The pupil then asked, "Where did you lose it, Mulla?". Mulla replied, "In the house." The pupil wondered, "Why don't you look for it in the house, Mulla?". Mulla replied nonchalantly , "It is brighter outside."

Applied to Anwar, crippling attacks and character assassination shall not stop until realpolitik objectives are not achieved no matter what even if it goes against religious, moral, legal universal or human considerations. Applied to BN-PAS reconciliation, they maybe barking up the wrong tree.

Anwar's detractors seem to be overly infatuated to the point of chronic alarm with his aspirations to be the nation's leader. If we were to ask him, Anwar says he wants to be able to conduct islah - reform the nation for the better. So, please brush aside those intolerable hearsay innuendos - just tell him and us what is so wrong with his ideas and politics so that we are free to choose democratically.

It is a mistake to simply categorise and stereotype people like Tuan Guru Nik Aziz as if PAS is similar to UMNO's "follow the leader right or wrong mentality". We have to give PAS their due credit in managing their own political transformation which out surpasses UMNO's illusions of change anytime. PAS is a party with a future and of the future. UMNO is still relishing and languishing in the past.

UMNO's foe is not Anwar, they are greatly mistaken for Anwar is part of their own history for them to judge. UMNO's bane is the party itself which desperately needs major reform and moral resuscitation even before they can think of reconciling with and partnering any other party with a better semblance of moral principles and practice.

It is actually no more about the continuance of Malay Muslim dominance and superiority (right or wrong!) - we must earn it through integrity and social justice, to build respect and deliver leadership to all Malaysians. We have to shed this presumed Malay thinking of this inherited superiority as the sole source of strength every time.

Yes, it is time for reconciliation but it is also a time for change.

( this is written in response to http://azrilmohdamin.com/2011/08/05/ramadhan-a-time-for-reconciliation/ )

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Posted By Outreacher to prihatin at 8/06/2011 09:19:00 PM

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Group that counts Islam among US’s ills to gather in Detroit, home to large Muslim community - WorldWide Religious News

http://wwrn.org/articles/36520/

Main - Malaysia - Petronas confirms MACC looking into complaints of ‘wrongdoing’ @ Fri Nov 11 2011

http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/petronas-confirms-macc-looking-into-complaints-of-wrongdoing/

Main - Bahasa - Petronas sah kunjungan SPRM, ‘teliti’ aduan salah laku @ Fri Nov 11 2011

http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/bahasa/article/petronas-sah-kunjungan-sprm-teliti-aduan-salah-laku/

Main - Malaysia - MACC raids Petronas over alleged graft among key employees @ Fri Nov 11 2011

http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/macc-raids-petronas-over-alleged-graft-among-key-employees/

Main - Malaysia - PM says unaware of graft in Petronas @ Fri Nov 11 2011

http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/pm-says-unaware-of-graft-in-petronas/

Thursday, November 10, 2011

Fwd: [cesmacs] Fw: SEKSUALITI MERDEKA: HORMATI KELUHURAN UNDANG-UNDANG

>
> Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM) merujuk kepada forum "Human Right for LBTIQ: Making it Real in Malaysia" anjuran Majlis Peguam Malaysia dan penganjuran aktiviti yang mempromosi nilai dan hak golongan LGBT oleh Kumpulan Seksualiti Merdeka sepanjang bulan November ini. ABIM memandang serius perkembangan golongan tersebut yang mutakhir ini begitu berani menuntut secara terbuka agar undang-undang Malaysia memberikan hak kepada golongan LGBT atas nama kebebasan hak asasi manusia sejagat. Kebebasan hak asasi yang dilaungkan oleh golongan LGBT ini adalah bukan sahaja bercanggah dengan ajaran agama Islam malah semua agama telah mengharamkam perhubungan sejenis sesama manusia. Ia adalah nilai songsang dalam masyarakat, dan agama mendefinisikannya sebagai di luar tabi'e. Selain itu, dalam sejarah ketamadunan manusia, golongan yang mengamalkan dan memperjuangkan kebebasan homoseks ini dianggap sebagai golongan pelampau (al-'adun) yang telah dibinasakan oleh Allah. Undang-undang negara adalah berasaskan agama. Perkara 3 Perlembagaan Persekutuan mengangkat Islam sebagai agama persekutuan, disamping turut memperuntukkan bahawa agama-agama lain boleh diamalkan di seluruh persekutuan. Kerana itu mana-mana tindakan yang bertentangan dengan agama adalah dianggap satu kesalahan. Kanun Keseksaan, di bawah Seksyen 377 telah menjelaskan bahawa perbuatan perhubungan sesama jantina adalah termasuk di bawah perbuatan di luar tabi'e dan ianya menjadi suatu kesalahan. Malah di bawah Enakmen Kesalahan Jenayah Syariah Negeri ia adalah suatu kesalahan syariah sekiranya dilakukan oleh orang Islam. Begitu juga dalam konteks perkahwinan, undang-undang negara telah mengharamkan perkahwinan sesama jenis. ABIM berpandangan sekiranya kebebasan asasi ini diangkat dan diiktiraf oleh undang-undang banyak implikasi perundangan boleh berlaku. Antaranya perhubungan sejenis ini akan diiktiraf, perkahwinan sesama jantina menjadi sah, dan pertukaran jantina boleh menjadi suatu yang halal di negara ini. ABIM ingin melahirkan kebimbangan sekiranya perkara ini berlaku, maka kehancuran sistem nilai dalam masyarakat akan menjadi parah. Sistem institusi keluarga juga bakal menuju kehancuran. Selain itu, perjuangan LGBT ini jelas bercanggah dengan nilai-nilai moral dan kesusilaan seperti mana yang terkandung dalam falsafah negara. Unsur negatif ini yang meresap dalam masyarakat akan menggagalkan sistem moral dan norma-norma ketimuran yang boleh menjerumus kita untuk menjadi seperti negara Barat yang tidak lagi berpegang kepada prinsisp agama dalam kehidupan. Justeru, ABIM menggesa pihak yang memperjuangkan hak asasi golongan LGBT ini menghormati keluhuran undang-undang negara demi menjaga keharmonian dan kesejahteraan rakyat. ABIM turut menggesa agar kumpulan terbabit menghormati sensitivi masyarakat beragama di negara ini dengan tidak mempromosikannya secara terbuka kerana dikhuatiri mampu menggugat ketenteraman awam dan keamanan negara selain mencipta fenomena yan tidak sihat di kalangan masyarakat. ABIM menyeru agar semua pihak termasuk badan bukan kerajaan (NGO), parti politik, jabatan kerajaan, dan masyarakat keseluruhannya menolak perjuangan kumpulan yang mendokong LGBT ini, dan mengecam secara khusus Kumpulan Seksualiti Merdeka yang telah menjadikan bulan November sebagai bulan meraikan aktiviti songsang yang bercanggah dengan nilai moral dan agama. ABIM menyambut baik ketegasan pihak PDRM dalam menangani kumpulan terbabit. Oleh itu, ABIM berharap agar lain-lain agensi penguatkuasaan seperti JAKIM, dan Jabatan Agama Islam Negeri dapat memainkan peranan yang lebih serius dan progresif khususnya dalam soal pemantauan dan pencegahan supaya aktiviti mereka tidak terus mencemarkan institusi moral masyarakat.

> M RAIMI AB RAHIM Setiausaha Agung, Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia

Future development of Mecca aims to fit heritage - WorldWide Religious News

http://wwrn.org/articles/36508/

Wednesday, November 09, 2011

Mobile - Malaysia - Don’t make Aidiladha sacrifices an issue, says DPM @ Tue Nov 08 2011

http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/mobile/malaysia/article/dont-make-aidiladha-sacrifices-an-issue-says-dpm/

Tuesday, November 08, 2011

Women & Islam: The rise and rise of the convert - WorldWide Religious News

http://wwrn.org/articles/36485/

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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875

Scenarios of an American strike
The risks are great if Washington's neo-cons choose military options to prevent Iran from blocking US imperial designs for the Middle East, writes Mustafa El-Labbad
Anticipated scenarios of an American military strike against Iran depend on a reading of pre- emptive force and Washington's military experiences since the end of the Cold War, in addition to military and regional balances in the Middle East area. The analysis outlined here does not take as its goal the defence of a theocratic Iranian regime; rather, it works to represent the underdog -- in this case the deep-rooted Iranian nation, historical neighbour to Arabs, which is holding fast to its right to possess nuclear technology according to international law.
Geographic distribution of Iranian nuclear facilities
In contrast stands America's use of force, the strongest military arsenal in history, unrestrained by moral or legal fetters, America preaching to the world about universal empire based on "divine" vision. True, force has been a primary factor in the building of empires throughout history, but it is also true that wisdom and aptness to rule has always been essential to the development and continuance of empires. Wisdom in the art of dominion has historically curbed the excessive use of force as a means of solving conflict. This qualification is lacking among the neo-cons of the current US administration, which has the world by the throat without mandate.
Despite the fact that Iran remains in accordance with international law, as well as the charters of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that allow for the enrichment of uranium for peaceful purposes, and the fact that it is signatory to the Additional Protocol that allows for surprise inspection of nuclear facilities, Iran did not succeed in confronting American pressure on member states in the IAEA board of governors, which led to the referral of Iran to the UN Security Council for action. If the fundamental legal principle is normally that one is presumed innocent until proven guilty, in the case of Iran the logic is reversed: Iran, the accused, is guilty until proven innocent beyond all shadows of doubt.
The basis of the US case against Iran is that Iran does not need a nuclear programme while it has immense reserves of oil and gas. Yet the irony is that it was Washington that brought nuclear technology to Iran for the first time ever during the era of the shah. Nuclear weapons remain a political and strategic tool allowing states to exert influence at a regional and international level. As such, the possibility of Tehran possessing such arms without American assent is a red line in Washington. In the history of the UN Security Council, there has not been one case of a state threatened with economic sanctions or military action successfully extricating itself without meeting the council's conditions.
Until now, Washington has succeeded in pulling Iran up before the UN Security Council without providing evidence to substantiate its allegations. Transferring Iran to the Security Council is considered a necessary step on the path to punitive measures, military strikes justified down the line on the argument that economic sanctions did not meet their goal. The military solution seems to be the final solution favoured by Washington in the case of Iran for numerous reasons, despite media claims that "the military scenario is not being considered now".
For its part, a regional role has long been a priority for Iran's national security establishment regardless of who has ruled in Tehran. Because its environs are crowded with nuclear powers (India, Pakistan and Israel, as well as US presence in Iraq and the Gulf), it is a given that Iran cannot play a regional role in this context without possessing nuclear capacities. Iran may wish to barter its "nuclear ambitions" or forfeit them, but only in the event of it participating as an internationally recognised regional power in the formation of the region's policies. This is exactly what Washington insistently rejects, considering this ambition as enabling Iran to lead with greater effectiveness the camp resistant to its "Greater Middle East" plan.
Western intelligence agencies -- particularly American -- fear the idea of Iran producing nuclear weapons within a short period, estimated at three years if no other party assists it or if Tehran makes technical changes to its nuclear programme. Western intelligence agencies believe that Iran maintains an open and acknowledged nuclear programme while concealing a parallel nuclear programme for non-peaceful purposes.
Because continued enrichment of uranium, even for limited research purposes at a very small number of facilities, raises questions about the possible presence of a secret programme to produce nuclear weapons, Iranian insistence on enriching uranium incites doubts over the peaceful intent of its nuclear programme. A programme to produce arms requires advanced enrichment of uranium with 80-90 per cent purity, as opposed to only five per cent for the purposes of generating energy. The work of Western intelligence agencies is complicated by the fact that Iranian nuclear facilities are located deep underground. Their distribution also makes intelligence gathering difficult.
Decision-makers in Iran have confirmed on more than one occasion their skill in strategic cunning. They excel in calculated attacks when conditions permit, bending with grace before storms when they hit. In all circumstances, consideration and protection of Iranian regional ambition is a constant. Nearly 30 years after the Iranian Revolution, during which time Iran faced an American economic and diplomatic embargo and a devastating war with Iraq that lasted more than eight years, Iran's regional influence is the strongest it has been in its modern history. For the first time since the establishment of the republic of Iraq in 1921, Iran's allies sit in seats of power in Baghdad, even forming the parliamentary majority due to American floundering following occupation.
In addition to Iraq, Iran continues to maintain allied relations with Damascus that have become more entrenched with successive pressures placed on Syria. And in addition to Iraq and Syria, Hizbullah is considered the strongest Lebanese entity, particularly after its success in ending Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon. Hizbullah is tied to Iran by way of religion, its arms and presence in Southern Lebanon allowing Iran and allies a military purview into the depths of Israel for the first time. Thus the area between the western Iranian border and northern Israel has become an area of competing Iranian- American influence in which Iran is stronger despite America's intense military presence in the region.
Iran's geographic overlook of the entire Arab Gulf, including the Hormuz Strait in the north, adds to its demographic strength and military capability, confirming that Iran is a major regional power in the Gulf. Iran's reach, however, also extends to Afghanistan through the Northern Alliance and the Hazara and Tajik militias, allowing it to shake the Afghan state founded on American security presence at will. Iran's regional presence extends from Afghanistan to Central Asia in Tajikstan and Turkmenistan, climbing the shores of the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus region. An American military strike on Iran would elicit responses on a geographic expanse wider than that of Iran's political-geographical borders. In the end, successive ramifications, or what is called the domino effect, will play a decisive role in forming conceptions of a military strike and its outcomes.
Additionally, the Iranian regime appears stable. Iran's nuclear programme is a top priority for the Iranian leadership, particularly since the arrival of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the summer of 2005. Since that time the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran has succeeded in tying nuclear ambition to Iranian national honour, making the nuclear file a point of national consensus, whether within Iran or among the overwhelming majority of the opposition abroad. The regime's survival and popular support for Iranian sovereign ambitions are tied; the latter becoming a new source of legitimacy of the Iranian regime.
Further, Iran's capacity to produce chemical weapons is estimated at approximately 1,000 tonnes per year. Iran may also possess a small arsenal of biological weapons. Iran's decision to resume enriching uranium in its Isfahan facility leads one to conclude that any military strike on this facility would result in a catastrophe of an extent and geographic scope that cannot be foretold due to the large probability of the spread of nuclear radiation and biological viruses. On the other hand, Iran possesses a relatively advanced missile defence system whose main component is a network of ground-to-air S-400 missiles deployed along Iran's borders with a target striking range of 400 kilometres, relatively effectively counteracting the threat of invading warplanes. American forces cannot neutralise Iranian ground defences with the ease it experienced in its military actions waged previously in Somalia, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq.
Iran's nuclear facilities, moreover, are protected by an additional network of Russian S-200 missiles that, while suffering from incompatibility between the directing systems controlling them and modern technological developments, provide a second network of defence around Iranian strategic targets. In addition, Iran concluded a pact with Russia in late 2005 to purchase 30 Tor M-1 ground-to-air missiles with a reach of only 12 kilometres but which are capable of striking targets at a height of 10 kilometres, whether airplanes or missiles fired from planes. These 30 missiles will most likely be employed to form a third ring of air defence against warplanes, specifically around nuclear facilities.
In terms of attack capabilities, Iran possesses the ability to transport unconventional weapons by solid fuel missiles (Shihab-3) with a range of approximately 1,800 kilometres. Using solid fuel to propel missiles increases their launching speed, which is an extremely important advantage. This development also allows the heads of Shihab-3 missiles to carry an additional load, whether chemical or biological, which multiplies its capacity for destruction.
This is the context in which to understand projected military scenarios. Before doing so directly, however, it is essential to underline one fact: political targets determine the nature of military operations. It is not possible to conceive the commencement of military operations, large or small, without first determining their political targets. In following, the intensity and force of military actions depends on the political target to be reached. In the case of Iran, there are four possible scenarios of graduated intensity and force.
First scenario: a limited military strike. According to military logic, Washington is capable of easily directing a limited strike on the battalions of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and selected military targets. It is possible for it to exhibit its technological products and use trans- continental missiles for which Iran has no military defence. There is no dispute over the American military's ability to do this with a high degree of success, striking Iranian targets and affecting the morale of the Iranian leadership and people, while exiting with near zero American human casualties.
Despite these facts, an essential question remains without theoretical answer: What are the political gains America would reap from a limited military strike? It is most likely that the Iranian regime would gain from the outcome politically, its being "wronged" before the world and underlining its "steadfastness" before its people. With this logic, it can be expected that a limited military strike would not halt Iran's nuclear programme, thus conflicting with the political goal of military action. This removes it from the list of possibilities for practical reasons.
The second scenario: the Israeli option. The air routes assumed for Israeli planes to reach Iran are over either Turkey or Jordan and Iraq. Because each route incurs regional costs that must be paid, it is most likely that the Israeli choice would be for the second because it would cost less. Turkey is a large regional state whose considerations, and also gains, must be considered. From a military perspective, Israeli planes are not able to target all Iranian nuclear facilities in one air raid due to a number of intertwining factors. Iran is more than 1,600 kilometres from Israel, requiring Israeli planes to cover 3,200 kilometres there and back, a feat impossible without the ability to refuel on the territory of a third state.
Further is the distribution of Iranian nuclear facilities around the country, which increases the mission's difficulty and differs from the case of the Iraqi Ozirak facilities Israel destroyed in the early 1980s. Moreover, any third state that would allow Israeli planes to cross its airspace would be placed in confrontation with Iran and would be subject to Iranian retributive strikes.
The third scenario: destroying the Iranian nuclear programme. American military experts have estimated that this scenario would last between one and two weeks, during which nuclear facility sites would be shelled with trans- continental missiles via bases on land and at sea. American air weapons with high fire intensity would be used, as well as technological means of disrupting Iranian air defences. According to this scenario, a raft of Iranian facilities would be targeted -- approximately 125 targets connected to the production and development of conventional and unconventional weapons, along with storage facilities, communications centres, and the headquarters of various forces. This would be in addition to primary nuclear facilities in Natanz, Arak and Bushehr, as well as the scientific centres in Isfahan and Tehran. The likelihood of an Iranian response is great in this scenario, as successful execution of such operations without an Iranian response would mean a total political defeat for the Iranian regime, its regional prestige, and its local legitimacy.
The fourth scenario: changing the Iranian regime. Practically speaking, the third and fourth scenarios do not differ much from an Iranian perspective. It is thus expected that Iran would play all of its regional and military cards in the event of scenarios three and four. The fourth scenario requires more military preparation than the third, including unconventional operations executed by special units, manoeuvres employing ground forces and operations that influence and penetrate the Iranian interior. To complement this, Washington may activate armed Iranian opposition groups currently in Iraq -- the mujahid-e-khalq -- to act within Iranian territory. Initial American military estimates for this scenario place it at 200 days for deployment, mobilisation, air and ground operations and penetration. Even according to optimistic estimates, the shortest period of engagement would be the longest operational fighting period since American forces were in Vietnam.
As Iran is a primary player in the global energy market, Iranian pre-emptive responses are likely to focus there. Iran is the second largest exporter of gas in OPEC, and it maintains the second largest natural gas reserves in the world. Further, Iran's influence over the global energy market is not restricted to its own energy capacity. It geographically overlooks the Hormuz Strait, and this, added to its missile capacity and that of its naval forces, has allowed it to easily block maritime activity in the Strait and thus halt the pumping of Gulf oil into international markets. It is well known that two medium-sized submarines can halt maritime activity in the Gulf for extended periods, during which oil prices flare up in international markets because Gulf oil forms the primary artery for supplying world energy.
Due to Iran's geographic location, it is also able to strike pipelines transporting oil from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean that pass through Azerbaijan and Georgia via its allies there. Its missile capacity also theoretically allows it to target oil drilling and extraction sites in the Caspian Sea, most of whose shares are owned by American and European companies. All of these theoretical abilities allow Iran to devastate the global oil market and transfer its losses to the industrial states in particular and the global economy in general. These possibilities have not been available to any Third World country previously.
The US has, since its occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq, become a neighbour to Iran, surrounding it in all directions. This fact produces another dimension; the fact that waging military operations between Iran and the United States places US forces within unprecedented reach of Iran. As a result, the possibilities for an Iranian response are not only tied to Tehran's military capabilities -- and mainly missile capacity -- but rather also to the array of geographical contexts in which American forces are present within proximity of Iran. Iran can (a) target American forces in Iraq from Iranian and Iraqi territory through Iran's allies; (b) target American military bases in the Gulf with Iranian missiles; (c) target American forces based in Afghanistan from Iranian and Afghani territory through Iran's allies.
Aside from targeting American forces, through regional proxies Iran may also target Tel Aviv. The Shihab-3 missile would deal a crushing blow to Israel, and while this remains a low possibility it is not improbable if the American administration decides on the third or fourth scenarios as its course of action on Iran. Indeed, it is expected that the current US neo-cons administration will prefer the third and fourth scenarios as the first and second allow Iran to mobilise a following beyond its political borders. Even following the success of military actions against it, this would make it more influential in the region. Yet the last two scenarios require more time for preparatory operations that include a number of regional and international measures.
As of now, it is expected that Washington will resort to exploiting Iranian efforts in deflecting pressure from the Security Council to prepare on various levels for waging military operations. The issuance of a resolution from the Security Council granting Iran a timeframe for submission of proof of its peaceful aspirations and permanently halting uranium enrichment activities or face sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter will follow shortly. In the time it takes to issue subsequent resolutions imposing economic sanctions and intensifying the formulation of previous resolutions, Washington will both use to prepare and to interpret as justification for undertaking military action.
One aspect of Western preparation will be drastically increasing oil supply from OPEC and elsewhere to allow for the creation of massive reserves in oil-consuming industrial states. Completing agreements with the governments of Iraq, Azerbaijan, and Georgia to build military and air bases and expand existing ones to increase the capacity for air force units participating in military operations will also indicate the direction of events.
Finally, watch this space. Military wars are no longer followed by media wars. The media has become theatre of operations wherein wars are often won or lost in advance. Based on previous American experience, strategic media communications in the case of Iran will be split into three stages. First will be building the groundwork, emphasising the "evil" nature of the Iranian regime. This stage is currently underway. Second will be expanding the crisis within America and abroad, internationalising what is a US- Iranian confrontation. This stage will be accompanied by the imposition of economic sanctions on Tehran. The third and final stage will be to choose the appropriate timing for war. When this moment comes, the media will correlate step- by-step with the military, and any international initiatives to solve the problem peacefully will be derided and defeated.
This piece is published in special agreement with Sharqnameh , a quarterly magazine focussed on political affairs in Iran, Turkey and Central Asia.

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Scenarios of an American strike

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